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Foreword
What happens to international environmental agreements once they are signed,
and how does the implementation of such agreements influence their effective-
ness? These are the questions that motivate the Implementation and Effectiveness
of International Environmental Commitments (IEC) Project at the International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria.
In this IEC essay, David G. Victor assesses the operation of the Non-
Compliance Procedure of the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete
the Ozone Layer. Although in operation for only six years, the Procedure and its
standing Implementation Committee have already made significant contributions
to the effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol. The Implementation Committee
serves as a forum for discussing compliance-related issues; it has played a central
role in managing individual cases of noncompliance.
Victor applies some lessons from the Montreal Protocol experience to the
design of noncompliance procedures and similar mechanisms in other multilateral
environmental agreements. He focuses on the Multilateral Consultative Process
(Article 13) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
This essay is one of three from the IEC Project that apply historical experience
to the possible designs for Article 13 of the Climate Convention. The essays
are contributions to the work of the Advisory Group on Article 13, a legal and
technical expert body that is currently exploring the need and possible designs for
Article 13.
Prof. Eugene B. Skolnikoff
Project Co-leader
International Environmental Commitments Project, IIASA
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Executive Summary
The Non-Compliance Procedure of the Montreal Protocol on Substances That
Deplete the Ozone Layer consists of two interlocking systems. The “regular” sys-
tem is managed by a standing committee, the Montreal Protocol Implementation
Committee. The Committee reviews specific cases of noncompliance, debates
general matters related to implementation of and compliance with the Protocol,
makes recommendations to other bodies, and issues a publicly available report
after every meeting. The Committee also operates a second, “ad hoc” system
that allows Parties to the Montreal Protocol to file “submissions” about alleged
noncompliance by other Parties or about problems with their own compliance.
The Secretariat can also invoke the ad hoc system, but is highly reluctant to do so.
This essay reviews the origins and operation of the Procedure. It evaluates
the role of the Implementation Committee as a forum for addressing compliance-
related issues and how specific cases of noncompliance have been handled. The
analysis covers the period from the Committee’s inception through December
1995, when the Committee handled its first cases in the ad hoc system.
During that period the Committee was quite active, which has led many
observers to hope that noncompliance procedures will prove to be an effective
means of handling compliance issues. In contrast, dispute resolution mechanisms
are often cited as devices for resolving compliance problems, but in practice they
have never been invoked in multilateral environmental agreements, despite many
instances of noncompliance.
Because it is small (only 10 members) and well-managed, the Committee has
improved the overall efficiency of the Montreal Protocol by serving as the forum
where compliance issues are first handled. Many of the issues are ultimately
referred to the Meeting of the Parties for formal decision, but the Committee
handles most of the debate and deliberation. It has also helped implement some
provisions of the Protocol. For example, it has played a central role in determining
Montreal Protocol policies on issues such as how to classify and reclassify Parties
eligible to receive special treatment as “developing countries” (Article 5). It has
xalso evaluated data submitted by non-Parties to determine which of these non-
Parties merit exemption from the Protocol’s trade sanctions against non-Parties
that are not in compliance with the Protocol.
Since 1993 the Committee has devoted an increasing share of its agenda to
handling specific cases of noncompliance. Initially these concerned primarily the
Protocol’s requirements to report data. In 16 cases where Parties have persistently
failed to report data, the Committee has invited them to explain their actions.
Four did not cooperate, but direct questioning of the others was influential; half
the Parties questioned brought some data with them or submitted data shortly
before the meeting. The Committee also has a wider effect on compliance with
data reporting by supporting the efforts of the Secretariat, which sends repeated
reminders to Parties that fail to report data. Virtually all of the Committee’s
attention to data reporting has concerned missing data. So far, little attention has
been given to the more difficult task of assessing and improving the quality of
data.
The Committee’s powers are limited to its ability to discuss and give public
exposure to noncompliance issues and make recommendations to the Meeting of
the Parties; consequently, its direct influence has been evident only in instances
where Parties have found it relatively easy to bring themselves into compliance.
Nonetheless, compliance with the Protocol’s data reporting requirements is higher
today than it would be without the Committee’s activities. However, where
compliance by developing countries has been at stake, even more important
has been funding from the Protocol’s Multilateral Fund (MLF) for projects to
gather and report data and build capacity to improve regular data reporting. The
Committee has helped to make MLF funding conditional on compliance with
reporting of initial, baseline data. The threat to remove MLF funding has been
made once (against Mauritania), with almost immediate results. The Committee
and the MLF cooperate by exchanging information, but their activities could be
much more integrated.
In 1994, when the Protocol’s commitments to control ozone-depleting sub-
stances (ODS) began to take full effect, the Committee’s work load expanded
beyond data reporting. Several countries with economies in transition, at their
own instigation, have raised concerns and sought the Committee’s advice about
their abilities to comply with the ODS controls.
For five years, from 1990 to 1995, the Committee worked solely as a standing
body that handled issues that it, other bodies, the Secretariat, and Parties thought
would be useful to address. In 1995 the Committee received its first submissions
under the ad hoc system, which concern the imminent noncompliance of five
Parties whose economies are in transition: Belarus, Bulgaria, Poland, Russia,
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and Ukraine (hereafter, the BBPRU submissions). The cases of Belarus, Russia,
and Ukraine are especially challenging because achieving compliance will require
implementation of costly projects. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) will
provide the funding, but it has made its resources conditional on the Committee’s
approval of each country’s plan to bring itself into compliance with the Protocol.
(GEF is not formally a part of the Montreal Protocol; it is providing the funds
because these countries are not “developing” and therefore are ineligible for MLF
funding.) The Committee will thus conduct regular performance reviews of each
country’s progress.
This essay includes a quantitative analysis that confirms three clear trends in
the Committee’s work load: (a) until recently most attention was given to compli-
ance with the Protocol’s data reporting requirements; (b) although the Committee
regularly handles general compliance issues, there has been a consistent increase
in attention to the compliance problems of specific Parties; and (c) nearly all of the
issues related to ODS controls handled by the Committee have concerned specific
problems encountered by specific Parties. These trends in its work load are an
encouraging sign that the Committee is responsive to changes in the compliance
issues that are the most relevant to the Protocol, and over time it has sought to in-
crease its effectiveness. Especially important is the increased attention to specific
cases of noncompliance. The detailed analysis in this essay shows that the Com-
mittee plays its most unique role, and has its greatest influence on compliance, by
handling specific cases.
Throughout its history, the Committee’s approach has been pragmatic. Its aim
has been to cooperate with Parties to find ways to achieve compliance rather than
to adjudicate and apportion blame. This essay explores why the Committee does
not have at its disposal stronger tools for achieving compliance, such as the ability
to make more of the benefits of the Montreal Protocol (notably MLF funding
and trade) conditional on compliance. The merits of a strong noncompliance
procedure and conditionality are controversial topics. In the Montreal Protocol,
stringent commitments have led some Parties that were unsure of their ability to
comply with the Protocol to be reluctant to adopt a more powerful noncompliance
procedure. The same experience need not repeat itself in other regimes: strong
commitments can and often must go hand in hand with strong compliance controls.
But the Montreal Protocol experience underscores that the design of compliance
systems is part of the package of substantive commitments that constitute an
international agreement.
The Montreal Protocol experience suggests some tentative lessons for the
design of noncompliance procedures and similar mechanisms within other inter-
national environmental agreements, such as under Article 13 of the Framework
xii
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). Among these is the benefit of promptly
establishing a limited-membership standing committee for handling the regular
supply of queries and mostly minor issues of noncompliance. In the case of the
FCCC, such a committee could contribute to issues related to data reporting as
part of the required “national communications,” and in doing so build experience
and legitimacy that will be needed if the committee is eventually also charged
with handling ad hoc submissions about noncompliance. However, the Montreal
model cannot be transferred directly. The relationship between a small committee
and a noncompliance procedure and the FCCC’s open-ended Subsidiary Body for
Implementation (SBI) must be addressed. No SBI-like body exists in the Montreal
Protocol. Moreover, unlike the Montreal Protocol experience, reporting of data
in the FCCC has been relatively complete; quality and comparability of data are
more problematic. Because of the characteristics of the industrial chemicals and
commitments in the ozone regime, data quality and comparability have not yet
been overly problematic issues; however, they will be extremely important in the
Climate Convention, where it could be more difficult to measure implementation
and compliance.
Acronyms
BBPRU Belarus, Bulgaria, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine
CFCs chlorofluorocarbons
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
EC European Community
ENGO environmental nongovernmental organization
FCCC Framework Convention on Climate Change
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GEF Global Environment Facility
HBFCs partially hydrogenated bromofluorocarbons
HCFCs partially hydrogenated chlorofluorocarbons
IE/PAC Industry and Environment Programme Activity Centre (UNEP)
ILO International Labour Organization
MLF Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol
NGO nongovernmental organization
ODP ozone-depleting potential
ODS ozone-depleting substance(s)
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEWG Open-Ended Working Group
SBI Subsidiary Body for Implementation
TEAP Technology and Economic Assessment Panel
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
VOCs volatile organic compounds
WTO World Trade Organization
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Introduction
Multilateral environmental agreements typically do not include effective ma-
chinery for handling problems of noncompliance. Many agreements include
requirements to submit reports. In practice, few reporting systems function well
and little is done with the data that are gathered.[1] A few agreements include
modest mechanisms for reviewing implementation, but typically no system is in
place to address specific compliance problems that might be detected. There has
been some unilateral monitoring and enforcement of multilateral agreements.[2]
However, many observers have pointed out that unilateral enforcement is a tool
available only to powerful states and is inconsistent with the multilateral spirit
that guides many international agreements. All recent multilateral environmental
agreements include dispute resolution procedures that in principle could serve
as a forum for addressing problems of noncompliance. In practice, these often
elaborate procedures are never used.[3]
Noncompliance procedures are a recent innovation that may improve the ca-
pacity to address problems of compliance with multilateral environmental agree-
ments. They provide a dedicated forum for discussing compliance problems.
Because they are consultative in spirit, they may be invoked more often than intrin-
sically confrontational dispute resolution systems. Because they are multilateral,
noncompliance procedures can handle compliance with collective obligations that
are ill-suited for bilateral, dispute-oriented systems. These procedures could offer
an outlet for handling many issues of noncompliance that would otherwise be left
An excerpt of this paper, with additional analysis applied to possible designs of noncompliance
procedures in other legal regimes (notably the Framework Convention on Climate Change), is
published as part of the proceedings of a workshop held in conjunction with the Seventh Meeting of
the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 4 December1995,
at Vienna, Austria. See Victor, D.G., 1996, The Montreal Protocol’s Non-Compliance Procedure:
Lessons for making other international environmental regimes more effective, in W. Lang, ed., The
Ozone Treaties and Their Influence on the Building of Environmental Regimes, Austrian Foreign
Policy Documentation, Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, Austria.
2unresolved. Such hopes are supported by the experience of multilateral supervi-
sion in the International Labour Organization (ILO), some of the many systems of
human rights supervision, and performance reviews conducted by the Organisa-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).[4] These experiences
are relevant to the design of consultative procedures, but none applies directly to
the situation in multilateral environmental agreements.
The only major international environmental agreement with an operating
noncompliance procedure is the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete
the Ozone Layer.[5] Given this unique position, its experience is highly relevant
for parties to other multilateral environmental agreements as they design similar
procedures. The Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention to
Combat Desertification, and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transbound-
ary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal are all in the early stages
of considering and designing noncompliance procedures. The 1991 Protocol con-
cerning the Control of Emissionsof Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) requires
that a noncompliance procedure be developed. The 1994 Second Sulphur Proto-
col has elaborated a system, based on the Montreal Protocol’s Non-Compliance
Procedure, that is not yet in operation.
Although the Montreal Protocol is a central model for other noncompliance
procedures, the literature that actually assesses its operation is limited. One
study documents the origins and design of the Procedure.[6] Others discuss
aspects of the early experience under the Procedure as well as some of the legal
issues.[7] But as yet there is no written, independent assessment of the actual
operation of the Montreal Protocol’s Non-Compliance Procedure. This essay
fills that gap. It reviews and assesses the origins, operation, and effectiveness
of the Procedure, giving special attention to the Implementation Committee, the
10-member standing committee that manages the Procedure.
The analysis is articulated in five parts. First, the origins of the Procedure
and its modalities of operation are briefly reviewed. Second, the operation and ef-
fectiveness of the “regular procedure” are analyzed. Under the regular procedure,
the Committee handles compliance issues as needed, without a formal submission
of noncompliance. Third, the first cases under the “ad hoc procedure” are pre-
sented and analyzed. They concern formal submissions of noncompliance by five
countries with economies in transition: Belarus, Bulgaria, Poland, Russia, and
Ukraine (hereafter the BBPRU submissions). These cases have not yet been fully
resolved; they are discussed here because the Committee’s approach to resolving
them gives a sense of the future role of the Non-Compliance Procedure as part of
the larger system of institutions that serve the aims of the Montreal Protocol. The
regular and ad hoc procedures are both handled by the Implementation Committee
3and have much in common. They are analyzed separately here because they are
two different ways to put issues on the Committee’s agenda and, in practice, they
have concerned compliance issues of markedly different severity.
Fourth, the Committee’s reports are analyzed quantitatively. This analysis
shows how the Committee’s work load has shifted from issues related to reporting
of data to problems of compliance with the Protocol’s commitments to control
ozone-depleting substances (ODS). The analysis also shows that the Committee
increasingly deals with case-specific problems of noncompliance. This trend is
important because the analysis of the regular and ad hoc procedures suggests that
by handling specific cases the Committee is most effective and serves its most
unique role within the Montreal Protocol’s system of institutions. A conclud-
ing section reiterates the main findings and implications for the design of other
noncompliance procedures.
2
Origins and Modalities of the Montreal
Protocol’s Non-Compliance Procedure
The Montreal Protocol’s negotiators knew that the treaty would probably face
problems of noncompliance and might need a procedure for handling them. In the
final stages of the negotiations, the USA proposed an elaborate noncompliance
procedure based on its review of how compliance issues had been handled in many
other treaties.[8] The proposal was viewed by some European participants as a
US negotiating strategy to clutter the agenda at the last minute. With neither time
nor consensus to work out the details of the procedure, the Protocol was adopted in
Montreal with only a short and loosely worded Article 8 that deferred addressing
the details of a noncompliance procedure until later.[9] The first Meeting of
the Parties of the Montreal Protocol, in 1989, established an ad hoc Working
Group of Legal Experts to develop proposals for a noncompliance procedure.[10]
Following a brainstorming session by members of the ad hoc group, the group’s
chairman, Patrick Sze´ll, produced a list of elements for the procedure that has
so far remained more or less intact. The ad hoc group had no particular model
in mind; rather, the procedure was developed based on the logic of the functions
it needed to perform.[11] The group recommended an interim Non-Compliance
Procedure, which was adopted by the Second Meeting of the Parties.[12] This
Procedure established the Implementation Committee as a standing committee
with five members, as well as some rules to allow a Party or group of Parties
to make a formal submission should they have concerns about another Party’s
compliance with the Protocol’s commitments. That Procedure was agreed only
on an interim basis because some Parties, led by Norway, thought a tougher
system for noncompliance would be needed.[13] Therefore, the ad hoc group
was reconvened and given a mandate to deliver a stronger Procedure; in parallel,
the Committee began to operate under the interim Procedure.
The interim period might have provided some useful experience to guide
the design of the final Non-Compliance Procedure. However, the Committee
5did little during its early meetings (notably in 1990 and 1991), and thus no real
lessons were learned or applied. The Committee did suggest some changes that
the reconvened ad hoc group considered, some of which were included in the
final Procedure. The two bodies’ memberships overlapped, so there was some
exchange of views. On the basis of a recommendation by the reconvened ad
hoc group, at the Fourth Meeting of the Parties the expanded final Procedure was
adopted (see Appendix 1).[14]
Throughout the negotiation of the interim and final systems, most countries
were not heavily involved with the design of the Non-Compliance Procedure,
which probably benefited from their benign neglect. Australia and a few of the
European participants (Austria, European Commission, Netherlands, Norway,
and UK) led the way; the Soviet Union and Argentina participated throughout the
process.[15] The USA participated actively, but starting in 1990 it became less
supportive of a strong Non-Compliance Procedure as it was also fighting battles
on the Multilateral Fund (MLF) and did not want a Procedure that could find
the USA in noncompliance with the delicate agreement on MLF contributions
(see discussion below).[16] A few active developing countries, primarily from
Latin America, were suspicious of a stringent process. The participation of those
countries that were concerned about their ability to comply with the Protocol
weakened the Procedure that was ultimately adopted.
The deliberations and thoughts behind specific elements of the Non-
Compliance Procedure and its overall legal context are discussed in more detail
elsewhere.[17] The general aim of the Procedure was to create a system that was
multilateral and aimed at building confidence through nonconfrontational discus-
sion rather than adjudication.[18] The Procedure was developed to be completely
independent of the dispute resolution system in the Vienna Convention.[19] The
introduction to the Non-Compliance Procedure underscores that “[i]t shall apply
without prejudice to the operation of the settlement of disputes procedure laid
down in Article 11 of the Vienna Convention.”
The terms of reference for the final Non-Compliance Procedure are given in
Appendix I. They consist of two major elements. The first element is a system
for handling submissions about noncompliance as described in paragraphs 1 to
4. Parties may enter a submission if they have concerns about another Party’s
implementation. A Party may also enter a submission about itself when it finds
that it cannot comply with the Protocol. The Secretariat has an ambiguous obli-
gation to inform the Implementation Committee if it becomes aware of possible
noncompliance.[20] The Procedure includes basic instructions and timetables
for communicating information about such submissions among the Parties, the
6Secretariat, and the Implementation Committee.[21] Collectively, these proce-
dures will be referred to here as the “ad hoc system.”
The Non-Compliance Procedure also creates a standing Implementation Com-
mittee. In what is referred to here as the “regular system,” the Committee meets
on a regular basis to consider compliance issues, even when it has no formal
submissions on its agenda. It reports its deliberations and recommendations to the
Meeting of the Parties, the Montreal Protocol’s supreme decision-making body.
The Committee is also charged with considering submissions under the ad hoc
system. During its first five years, most of the Committee’s work load concerned
the regular system. The ad hoc system was invoked for the first time in mid-1995
(the BBPRU submissions). In all of its work, the Committee’s mandate is to seek
amicable solutions “on the basis of respect for the provisions of the Protocol.”
The Committee consists of 10 members who serve as representatives of their
countries (i.e., not in their personal capacities) and are selected for “equitable
geographic distribution.” This system contrasts with that of the ILO, where
members of supervisory committees, except for the (more political) Conference
Committee, serve in their individual expert capacities.[22] Because the Montreal
Protocol’s Procedure includes only one Committee, it must handle all expert and
political functions; its members could potentially handle political topics, and
therefore all act on behalf of governments.
In practice, Committee membership is roughly balanced between industrial-
ized and developing countries. Members may serve for up to two consecutive
two-year terms. The work of the Committee is growing more complicated, and
its president has encouraged two-term (four-year) participation in an effort to pro-
mote continuity.[23] In practice, the two-year terms are staggered so that at most
half the members are replaced in any given year. Following the practice in other
meetings of the official bodies of the Montreal Protocol, Committee members
and invited participants who represent developing countries are offered assistance
from a trust fund for travel and local costs associated with the meetings. Bilat-
eral aid supports participation by representatives from countries with economies
in transition; none is considered a “developing country,” but many face similar
financial problems.
The Procedure’s rules explicitly allow participation in the Committee’s delib-
erations by only three groups: members of the Committee, the Secretariat, and any
Party involved in a submission. In addition, the Committee invites other partici-
pants as needed. No Party involved in a matter being considered by the Committee
may participate in the elaboration and adoption of related recommendations.
Because financial assistance is often crucial to a Party’s ability to comply,
the Committee must maintain an “exchange of information” with the Montreal
7Protocol’s MLF. Since 1992 representatives from the Secretariat of the MLF
and its four implementing agencies have been invited to attend meetings of the
Implementation Committee. Ever since, most of those organizations have been
represented at most Implementation Committee meetings. The president of the
Implementation Committee, an Austrian, has also attended the meetings of the
Executive Committee of the MLF (of which Austria is also a member, and so would
have been represented anyway). A representative of the Global Environment
Facility (GEF) has attended every meeting of the Implementation Committee
since the ad hoc system was first invoked. None of the BBPRU countries is
eligible for MLF funding, and thus they will rely on the GEF to provide the
financial assistance they need to comply with the Protocol.
There are no provisions for attendance at the Committee’s deliberations by
other international organizations, countries that are not Parties to the Protocol, or
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Three non-Parties – Armenia, Georgia
and Kyrgystan – were once invited to discuss their situations with the Committee
because they are likely to be affected by the handling of Russia’s noncompliance,
with whom they have close trading relationships. But participation remains
controlled and limited. An environmental group informally made the first request
by an NGO to attend an Implementation Committee meeting; it was denied (June
1995) on the basis that confidential, delicate, and sensitive information might be
discussed and the presence of an NGO could limit frank discussion.[24] Although
they currently do not participate in meetings, in principle NGOs can raise issues for
possible discussion by working through the Secretariat or sympathetic members
of the Committee; so far this has never happened.
Meetings have been held twice a year but are likely to be held more frequently
as the work load increases. They are typically scheduled back-to-back with other
related meetings to allow efficient participation. The working language is English;
requests for translation during the meeting have been refused, but starting in 1996
translation will probably be provided on a limited basis when necessary.[25]
Reports are written after every meeting and, with the exception of the first
report (which says little), they have had unrestricted distribution and are trans-
lated into all United Nations (UN) languages. The Committee can consider
confidential data, but its public reports obviously must not include confidential
information.[26] The problem of how to handle confidential data has long been
an issue in the ozone regime because some data on ODS have commercial value
to market competitors.[27]
3
Operation and Effectiveness
of the Regular System
During its first five years, until 1995, all of the work of the Implementation
Committee was done under the regular system. The Committee acts as a standing
body to hear issues that Parties to the Protocol, the Secretariat, other institutions
of the Montreal Protocol, and Committee members think are important to address.
This section answers three central questions about the operation of the Committee:
How do issues arrive on the Committee’s agenda? How does the Committee
handle the issues on its agenda? Why does the Committee not have tougher
responses available to it? This study will show that the regular system has
made valuable contributions to the Montreal Protocol system. Other international
regimes, such as the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), might
emulate the practice of establishing a committee that operates even when formal
cases of noncompliance have not been lodged. The distinction is made here
between the regular and ad hoc systems, both of which are means of putting issues
on the agenda. The ad hoc procedure is discussed separately, in the next section,
in an effort to carefully distinguish the operation of these two different modes.
The Committee’s Agenda
The issues that can be handled in the regular system reflect the primary respon-
sibilities and benefits of membership in the Montreal Protocol: reporting of data,
operation of the MLF, and control of ODS. Each is considered in turn below. In
practice, the Committee’s agenda is flexible; therefore, the analysis also considers
how specific agenda items are selected from the universe of possibilities and how
certain politically sensitive issues are avoided.
9Data Reporting
All Parties to the Montreal Protocol are required to submit baseline and annual data
on production, imports, and exports of each controlled substance.[28] Until 1995
most of the Committee’s work load concerned inadequate reporting of baseline
data and problems related to assessing and revising reported data. Most of these
issues have been put on the Committee’s agenda due to the Secretariat’s efforts
to compile all reported data and identify Parties that have failed to supply the
required data.[29] This Secretariat-led mode of agenda setting has been quite
efficient because the Secretariat can easily and regularly inform the Committee on
this topic. Nearly every Committee meeting begins with a lengthy review by the
Secretariat of the state of data reporting. Problem cases are highlighted; some are
considered in detail. Since the third meeting of the Committee, the Secretariat’s
report has included a list of specific countries whose data are most incomplete.
The Secretariat’s report has identified data reporting problems in all types of
countries. Among the countries with economies in transition, two years before
the BBPRU submissions were lodged the Committee questioned Belarus, Russia,
and Ukraine about their failure to report data. Western industrialized countries
have also encountered some problems. The European Community (EC), which
is a Party along with each EC member country, had difficulty compiling data
on consumption of ODS because of trade among EC members and the desire to
protect confidential business information.[30] Italy encountered severe bureau-
cratic problems in preparing its data reports.[31] These cases illustrate that low
“capacity” to comply is not only a problem in developing countries.
Problems of missing data have been more extensive in developing countries
than in developed countries. For example, by 1994 baseline data were overdue
from 51 developing countries. Only 9 countries not operating under Article 5
had overdue baseline data. Of those 9, only 1 was an OECD member (Luxem-
bourg).[32]
Data from developing countries are especially important for implementing
the Protocol. The Protocol provides two major benefits to developing countries:
financial assistance from the MLF and lenient provisions for controlling con-
sumption of ODS, such as a 10-year delay in the requirement to phase out major
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and Halons.[33] Article 5 of the Protocol determines
eligibility for these benefits: a Party must be both a “developing country” and
have consumption of ODS below certain per capita thresholds.[34] There is no
single definition of a “developing country,” but in 1989 the Meeting of the Parties
adopted a list that has since been adjusted slightly.[35]
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The other half of the Article 5 definition is its most innovative part, but
it is impossible to implement without data on population and consumption of
ODS. Regarding population data, at the request of the Secretariat, the Committee
has reviewed (and approved) the practice of using mid-year population estimates
drawn from the UN for the purpose of computing per capita consumption.[36] (UN
data are drawn from reports submitted by UN member countries.) In practice,
some countries also submit their own population data directly to the Montreal
Protocol. The Secretariat does its best to smooth out any differences between
the two sets of data. So far only Lebanon has submitted population data that
are significantly different from the UN data. Some countries report data to the
Executive Committee of the MLF that are different from data they have reported
to the Montreal Protocol’s Secretariat. Recently, the Implementation Committee
and Parties urged the Secretariat to compare these different data sets in an effort
to adopt the most accurate data; nonetheless, in the case of conflicts such as the
Lebanese population data, the Committee has advised that the data supplied by
the Party must be used.[37]
The Secretariat or any Party can formally raise concerns about the veracity
of reported data. However, none has done so. Nor has the Committee sought to
check the veracity of any data, although it has the mandate to do so if it wishes.
In practice, the Secretariat checks incoming data to see if they are reasonable
and communicates directly with the Party if they are not. However, whenever
the Secretariat has prepared its annual report on data and led the agenda of the
Implementation Committee on data, it has focused exclusively on missing data
rather than suspected inaccuracies in the data.
The problem of missing data from developing countries can be addressed
only with funded projects to gather baseline data and build capacity to report
data on an annual basis. Such projects have taken time to develop. Yet, the data
for purposes of determining compliance and classification under Article 5 were
required very early on because Article 5 status determined which countries were
eligible to receive MLF funding and which had to contribute to the MLF. Thus,
many Parties have employed estimates of their data, a practice that is explicitly
allowed under the Protocol.[38] Presumably estimates could be manipulated, but
this issue has not been addressed directly by the Committee.[39] Initially, the
Secretariat made estimates to determine whether particular countries were above
or below the Article 5 thresholds. Those estimates have not been reviewed or
challenged by the Committee, but an ad hoc Group of Experts on the Reporting of
Data reviewed the status of some countries on the borderline of qualifying under
paragraph 1 of Article 5.[40]
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Related to the accuracy of data is the correction of reported data and the
reclassification of countries under Article 5. A Working Group preparing for the
Meeting of the Parties asked the Committee to address these issues, particularly
how to handle funding of MLF projects in countries that are reclassified under Ar-
ticle 5. In response, the Committee has provided some guidance to the Executive
Committee of the MLF.[41] One outcome of its deliberations was a Decision by
the Meeting of the Parties to continue funding projects already under way but not
to allow additional projects once the country has been reclassified.[42]
The Protocol includes restrictions on trade of controlled substances that must
be used against states that have not become Parties.[43] This threat helps explain
why so many countries have joined the Montreal Protocol. States that are not
Parties to the Protocol can avoid trade restrictions if they submit data that demon-
strate that they are complying with the control measures concerning the particular
controlled substance.[44] The Meeting of the Parties is responsible for making a
final determination of which Parties are exempt from the trade restrictions, but it
has asked the Implementation Committee to review the data submitted by states
seeking such an exemption. In this capacity, the Committee has considered data
from 22 states; it has accepted 13 as sufficient to qualify for an exemption.[45]
In doing so, the Committee has demonstrated one of its roles in facilitating the
implementation of the Protocol, in addition to handling problems of inadequate
implementation (noncompliance) as they arise.
Multilateral Fund Issues
For most of the Implementation Committee’s history, representatives of the MLF
and its implementing agencies have attended the Committee’s meetings.[46] As
with the Secretariat, the representatives give periodic reports to the Committee on
their activities. Over time, the Committee’s work has been increasingly linked to
that of the MLF, especially in matters of data reporting. The MLF funds projects to
collect and report baseline and annual data. Thus, MLF representatives can offer
precise information about projects to improve the reporting of data by developing
countries, which has been valuable to the Committee in its handling of specific
noncompliance problems as well as its general deliberations.
Although representatives of the MLF and its implementing agencies are re-
sponsive to requests for information on their projects, they have never brought
particular instances of noncompliance before the Committee, nor have they ac-
tively sought the Committee’s advice. This may reflect that the MLF and its
implementing agencies are primarily concerned with disbursing funds and often
take the perspective of the recipient and the need for stable funding of projects
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rather than that of the enforcer of compliance. Insofar as they review Party per-
formance and perhaps connect MLF benefits to it, they do so through their own
review procedures and not through the Protocol’s dedicated Non-Compliance
Procedure and Implementation Committee.
Beyond some communication, few active links exist between the work of
the MLF and that of the Implementation Committee; however, the Committee
has played a role in introducing the principle of conditionality to MLF funding.
Prompted by the concerns of many MLF donor countries, the Open-Ended Work-
ing Group (OEWG) prepared for the 1994 Meeting of the Parties by exploring
ways to make continued MLF funding to Parties conditional on compliance with
the Protocol’s requirement to report data. The OEWG asked the Committee to re-
view the decisions.[47] Following the guidance of the OEWG and the Committee,
the Meeting of the Parties adopted a Decision to cut funding to countries that do
not report baseline data within one year of approval of their MLF country program
and the implementation of projects to strengthen institutional capacity.[48] Since
country programs typically include funding to collect and estimate baseline data, a
task often performed by outside consultants, in principle this conditionality should
not be too onerous. Forged with the assistance of the Implementation Committee,
this is the first explicit linkage between compliance by the Parties and the benefits
provided under the Protocol, in this case, funding.
This conditionality has not significantly affected the agenda or work of the
Committee. Although it is difficult to judge, conditionality has probably increased
the effectiveness of efforts within the Montreal Protocol system to improve data
reporting. The Secretariat’s pressure on a Party to report baseline data is probably
more influential because of the credible threat that failure to supply this data
will result in the Party’s losing Article 5 status. On one occasion, the case of
Mauritania, the persistent failure to supply baseline data led the Implementation
Committee to recommend withdrawal of the country’s Article 5 status.[49] Within
days of that recommendation, with a draft Decision to be adopted imminently by
the Meeting of the Parties, Mauritania submitted the needed data.[50] Although
it is evidently influential, at least in the Mauritania case, this conditionality is
highly limited. It applies only to baseline data: no such conditionality exists for
the annual data that Parties are also required to report, which are chronically late
and incomplete.
Control of Ozone-Depleting Substances
The Non-Compliance Procedure and Implementation Committee may ultimately
be judged primarily on their ability to improve compliance with the Protocol’s
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main substantive obligations: to limit and phase out consumption of ODS. For
countries not operating under Article 5, these requirements consist primarily of
 The elimination of the three controlled Halons by 1994;
 The elimination of 15 CFCs, carbon tetrachloride, and methyl chloroform by
1996;
 The elimination of transitional partially hydrogenated chlorofluorocarbons
(HCFCs) by 2030;
 The elimination of partially hydrogenated bromofluorocarbons (HBFCs) by
1996; and
 A freeze on methyl bromide by 1996.[51]
There are timetables for these phaseouts in most cases, some additional limits
within each category, and some exceptions, notably for “essential uses.” The
Seventh Meeting of the Parties (Vienna, December 1995) strengthened some of
these measures, notably for methyl bromide.[52]
These controls are only now taking full effect, thus the potential cases of
noncompliance are only now becoming evident. Because of delays in submitting
annual data, even once a deadline has passed it may take several years for a full
assessment of compliance.
The countries to which these obligations apply fall broadly into three cate-
gories: developed countries without economies in transition (mainly the members
of the OECD, except for the Czech Republic, Mexico, and Turkey); countries
with economies in transition; and developing countries that exceed the Article 5
thresholds. Each category is considered here. Developing countries that are still
operating under Article 5 do not yet face stringent requirements concerning the
control of ODS, thus their compliance with such controls is not discussed.
First, all OECD developed countries appear to be on track to comply with the
Protocol, and thus it is unlikely that they will be a source of noncompliance issues
to be handled by the Implementation Committee. Most OECD countries imple-
mented domestic laws or regulations that phased out the principal CFCs and/or
Halons more rapidly than was required by the Protocol’s targets.[53] Nonetheless,
it is unclear how compliance will fare as the control levels decrease to zero and
the list of allowable essential uses is pared down. Indeed, the Secretariat and
the Committee have become aware of some potential cases of noncompliance;
however, these cases have not been on the Implementation Committee’s agenda
because they are already being handled elsewhere. For example, the US Cus-
toms Service has discovered some problems with falsified import documents that
claimed that virgin chemicals had actually been recycled.[54] The USA is ad-
dressing this issue on its own. Many similar cases in OECD countries underscore
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that the commitments under the Montreal Protocol have made some ODS as valu-
able as illegal drugs, leading to similar problems of smuggling and enforcement
of border controls. For now, the Committee has rightly decided that it cannot
do much to help, but in principle these could become issues of noncompliance
that the Committee or other Parties might want to discuss. The number of these
potential agenda issues may increase now that the phaseouts are in full effect,
because such problems will become more detectable and the economic value will
be higher when allowable consumption is zero. Already the Committee’s efforts
to address Russian noncompliance with the Protocol might reduce some illegal
trade in ODS, as there is evidence of a large Russian supply (see the discussion
below on the first cases in the ad hoc system).
Second, several countries with economies in transition are encountering sig-
nificant problems of noncompliance. These countries are not considered to be
“developing countries,” and thus are not eligible for Article 5 status. As is dis-
cussed later in this essay, five such countries (including Russia) have invoked the
ad hoc system. However, most of them and a few others, had already had some of
their compliance problems on the Committee’s agenda before the ad hoc system
was invoked. Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine had explained their failure to report
data (see discussion above). Poland forecast its inability to meet domestic demand
for CFCs because the supply from the EC was being phased out; it sought from the
Committee (but was denied) special treatment that would have involved imports
during 1994 and 1995 in excess of the Protocol’s limits in order to meet Polish
domestic needs after the EC’s 1995 phaseout.[55] Romania sought to transfer
some of its production quota to Greek firms, which might have affected Greece’s
compliance.[56] Russia, followed by Ukraine, predicted its noncompliance with
the 1994 Halon ban and announced through the Implementation Committee that
it would need additional financial transfers, access to Halon banks, and/or lenient
treatment from the Meeting of the Parties in order to remain in compliance.[57]
In a letter from its prime minister to the Ozone Secretariat, Lithuania sought a
five-year delay in implementing some controls on ODS.[58] Nearly all the issues
on the Committee’s agenda concerning ODS controls have pertained to countries
with economies in transition. In each case, the issue was put on the Committee’s
agenda because the Party volunteered to discuss its concerns.
Third, some developing countries might face noncompliance with ODS con-
trols because their consumption of ODS exceeds what is allowed under Article
5. Countries on the borderline of Article 5 status could face sudden problems
of formal noncompliance, as well as loss of MLF funding. The Implementation
Committee is clearly the logical place to handle such issues, but so far none of
this type have been on its agenda. One reason is the correction of data. In 1995
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five developing countries were classified with per capita consumption above the
Article 5 threshold.[59] Two of them (Kuwait and Lebanon) corrected their data,
bringing themselves back below the threshold, and thus avoided the problem of
sudden noncompliance. Kuwait claimed that there had been a typographical error
in its Halon data. Lebanon challenged the population statistics used to calculate
per capita consumption (see discussion above). Two of the remaining countries
(Cyprus and Slovenia) intend to comply with the Protocol without Article 5 status
(both also want to join the European Union, none of whose members are “devel-
oping countries”). The last of these five countries (United Arab Emirates) has not
submitted even its baseline data; its compliance remains unclear.
Selecting the Agenda
Because the Committee operates as a standing body rather than one convened only
to hear particular cases, its agenda is flexible. The Secretariat and Committee are
active in deciding which topics they want to pursue, because until recently most
issues have not arrived on the Committee’s agenda on their own. They have
focused on issues and cases where they think they can make a contribution and
where their advice is sought.
Flexibility in setting the agenda has allowed the Committee to avoid certain
issues, notably the politically sensitive matter of contributions to the MLF. The
legal status of these contributions is purposely vague. Most donor countries in-
terpret the obligation to contribute to the MLF as binding; the USA treats it as
voluntary. The text of the MLF agreement says neither. None of the donor Parties
wants to raise the issue formally as it might unravel the delicate MLF agreement,
which survives through a combination of differing interpretations and the fact that
the MLF appears to be working well. Indeed, all major contributors have paid
their shares. The only OECD members that have persistently failed to pay their
contributions are Italy and Portugal. Clarifying the status of MLF contributions
might even be counterproductive. Of the US$119 million outstanding (22% of to-
tal “agreed” contributions), half is due from Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. These
countries are now also addressing their failure to comply with the Protocol’s ODS
controls and will themselves require financial assistance to achieve full compli-
ance. The GEF has agreed to provide the money, and the issue of their delinquent
MLF contributions has been informally set aside and is not part of the resolution
of their ad hoc submissions (see discussion below). Facing scrutiny on their MLF
contributions while also in front of the Implementation Committee because of
failure to implement the Protocol’s control measures might have deterred these
countries from volunteering to discuss their noncompliance.[60]
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The Parties themselves can also shape the deliberations of the Committee by
not cooperating. Delegates from three countries (Maldives, Trinidad and Tobago,
and Togo) simply did not appear when requested in 1993 to discuss their failure
to report data.[61] However, such behavior has been rare. Indeed, all the more
severe issues of noncompliance that have been discussed by the Committee have
been instigated by the affected Parties themselves. They participate because it
is in their interest to do so: they want the Committee’s advice and imprimatur.
In short, a substantial and growing part of the Committee’s work load directly
reflects issues that the affected Parties themselves want to address.
The flexibility of the Committee’s agenda is not absolute. In principle, any
ad hoc submission to the Committee must be heard, because the Procedure gives
no mandate to decide formally against hearing an issue, unless the submission
is not accompanied by the required corroborating information.[62] In practice,
conflicts over whether to hear formal submissions are likely to be rare, because
most problems will probably be addressed before any formal submission is lodged.
However, the experience to date does not offer any guide.
Summary on Agenda Setting
The issues that have arrived on the Implementation Committee’s agenda have
reflected some of the main obligations of the Montreal Protocol. All Parties
are required to report data; the failure of many to supply the required data has
continuously been on the agenda. Requirements to phase out ODS went into
full effect in 1994 (Halons) and 1996 (CFCs), and increasingly the Committee’s
agenda has been dominated by the failure of a few Parties to fully implement such
controls.
Virtually all issues related to data reporting have arrived on the Committee’s
agenda at the initiative of the Committee or the Secretariat. The Secretariat can
easily identify countries that have failed to report required data. The Committee
has given clear support to the Secretariat’s efforts to cajole recalcitrant Parties into
reporting data. The Committee has invited all of the most delinquent Parties to
appear before it and explain their behavior. Some specialized issues related to data
reporting, such as reclassification of Article 5 countries and the use of estimated
data, have been put on the Implementation Committee’s agenda by other Montreal
Protocol institutions, including the Meeting of the Parties.
In contrast, all the issues related to compliance with the Protocol’s obliga-
tions to phase out ODS have been put on the Implementation Committee’s agenda
by the affected Parties themselves. This style of volunteering to discuss non-
compliance may set the pattern for the Committee’s work and distinguishes the
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Non-Compliance Procedure from accusatory dispute resolution systems. Cur-
rently, most of its work concerns compliance issues that were brought to the
Committee by the affected Parties, sometimes after those Parties failed to obtain
a hearing elsewhere. Three years ago the opposite was true: at that time most
of the Committee’s work reflected issues put on its agenda by the Secretariat and
Committee members.
Representatives of the MLF and its implementing agencies regularly partic-
ipate in the deliberations of the Committee and provide critical information on
MLF projects. However, the link between the MLF and the Non-Compliance Pro-
cedure remains surprisingly weak. Conditionality has been established between
MLF funding and compliance with data reporting requirements, but in practice
this concerns only baseline data and not the persistent problem of incomplete
annual data. The link portends a possible closer relationship between funding
and compliance, but so far the MLF has not referred compliance problems to the
Implementation Committee. The obligation to pay funds into the MLF is the only
significant commitment under the Montreal Protocol that has never been on the
agenda of the Implementation Committee.
Actions Available to the Committee and Their Effectiveness
Once an issue is on the agenda, the tools available to the Committee are limited.
It can discuss issues, make recommendations to the Meeting of the Parties, and
make transparent which Parties are in compliance.[63] The ability to discuss
issues and make recommendations allows the Committee to serve as a forum.
As such, the Committee can improve awareness of compliance issues and serve
as a “first stop” for handling matters that ultimately go to the Meeting of the
Parties for formal decision. The ability to make transparent which Parties are in
compliance can be influential because delegates and other national officials might
fear the embarrassment of representing noncompliant countries. Some officials
and NGOs might not even be aware of their nation’s noncompliance until a report
or official query from the Committee makes the problem transparent. These three
interrelated tools – discussion, recommendation, and transparency – are often
described as elements of a “soft” approach to managing compliance. Those tools
may nonetheless be influential, especially as “hard” techniques such as sanctions
are often not available or effective.[64]
This section analyzes how the Committee has applied these tools; the next
section explores why the Committee does not have stronger tools at its disposal.
The analysis asks whether the Committee has had an effect on the individuals,
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firms, and countries whose behavior is the target of the Montreal Protocol. It
traces whether the Committee has had a direct effect on behavior. Moreover,
it examines whether the Committee has had indirect influence on behavior by
making it possible for the other institutions and commitments of the Montreal
Protocol to be more effective than they would be otherwise. Evaluating the
direct and indirect influences of international institutions on behavior is difficult
because evidence is often incomplete and assessing whether an institution has
been influential requires considering what might have happened otherwise.
Discussion and Recommendations
There is only limited evidence that discussion about general issues of compliance
has led to greater awareness of what constitutes compliance and ways to improve
it. For example, the Committee and Secretariat have stressed that Parties that are
unable to provide real baseline data can comply with the requirement by supplying
estimates. Many Parties have now done so, and a few may not have known about
that possibility before. However, in the case of the Russian Federation, where the
need for some data was extremely urgent because the country is a large producer
and consumer of controlled substances, repeated requests even for estimates were
not rewarded with data. Russia fully complied with the baseline data requirement
only later, when its noncompliance was being handled under the ad hoc system
and the Committee required data before it would approve the Russian compliance
plan (see discussion below). Focused discussion could also promote effectiveness
by making Parties aware of solutions that have been employed in other countries.
However, there is no evidence from the operation of the Committee that merely
exchanging views has resulted in that benefit.
The Committee has been quite active and influential as a “first stop” forum
for discussion of specific cases. As recently as 1993 the role of the Committee
within the Montreal Protocol was unclear. Today, it is increasingly accepted as the
first forum in which to air compliance issues before other avenues are pursued.
For example, Romania asked that its request to transfer production quotas to
Greek firms be addressed by the Meeting of the Parties in 1994, but the issue
was sent to the Implementation Committee first. The BBPRU cases began as a
Russian appeal submitted on behalf of all five countries to the Meeting of the
Parties, but the request was rerouted through the Implementation Committee. In
this role, the Committee has substantially improved the overall efficiency of the
Montreal Protocol’s system of institutions. As reviewed in the previous section,
the Committee has debated and prepared some draft decisions for the Meeting
of the Parties. It has largely resolved many issues related to the reclassification
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of Article 5 countries and the correction of data. It has probably helped to
dispose of some potentially cumbersome issues before they grew too large; for
example, the question of whether developing countries can transfer production
quotas to industrialized countries. Without the Committee, these issues would
be on the agenda of other institutions or, worse, would not be addressed at
all. The Committee is becoming the most efficient body for handling them
because its members (and the Secretariat) are increasingly experienced and expert
on all matters related to compliance with the Protocol. These are important
contributions, but the same can be said of any well-designed subsidiary body
with limited membership: it debates issues on its agenda and reaches sensible
recommendations.
The most important current example where the Committee serves as a “first
stop” forum are the BBPRU submissions. The cases, described in more detail
below, help to illustrate why the Implementation Committee is different from
other subsidiary or ad hoc bodies. Before those cases were formally lodged, four
of the countries (Belarus, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine) had already raised their
imminent noncompliance with the Committee.[65] Those discussions did result
in some airing of views, during which the Committee repeatedly underscored that
its role was as a deliberative forum with neither the desire nor the authority to tailor
the commitments of the Protocol to the circumstances of particular parties. This
style has remained central to the Committee’s deliberations, both in the regular
system and in its handling of the ad hoc cases. But it may also explain why
Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, all of which wanted the Protocol’s commitments
to be tailored to their needs, had merely informed the Committee about their
looming noncompliance rather than seeking the Committee’s advice on how to
proceed.[66] These countries became more engaged in discussing their situations
only once the ad hoc system had been invoked and the Committee was the only
forum in which they could present their cases. The experience suggests, but does
not prove, that the Committee’s role in the regular procedure may be enhanced
now that it has demonstrated its central role in the ad hoc system.
After discussion of an issue, the Committee’s actions are limited to making
recommendations.[67] The Meeting of the Parties makes the final decisions. This
division of power is understandable since giving the Implementation Committee
greater powers of decision would require significant revisions of the Committee’s
mandate and of the Protocol itself. The practice of the Committee that has
evolved is essentially conservative. The Committee does not appear to be trying
to expand its decision-making role, although it is trying to secure its special place
in the Montreal Protocol’s system of institutions as the body responsible for issues
related to noncompliance. In practice, decisions adopted by the Meeting of the
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Parties have never substantially deviated from the Implementation Committee’s
recommendations, a fact that has strengthened its place. Today the Committee
has the imprimatur as the legitimate body within the Montreal Protocol’s system
for handling compliance issues. Two years ago it had not yet developed that
reputation.
Transparency
A second way the Committee might influence behavior is by making cases of
noncompliance transparent. Of the Montreal Protocol’s institutions, the Secre-
tariat plays the most important role in making compliance transparent, notably
through its compilation of baseline and annual statistics on the consumption of
ODS. These statistics reveal (with self-reported data) which countries are com-
plying with the obligations to limit ODS and to supply data. The Secretariat’s
gathering of data and making compliance transparent is probably more effective
because the Committee and the Meeting of the Parties regularly support its ac-
tivities. When the Secretariat writes to Parties to inform them that they are not
complying with the Protocol’s requirement to submit data, it is able to refer to
a specific mandate from the Implementation Committee that probably gives the
missive more weight.[68] However, it is difficult to marshal evidence to support
this claim of the Committee’s indirect influence on compliance.
Considerable evidence is available to show the importance of transparency in
several egregious cases of failure to report data where the Committee has become
directly involved. Nine Parties were invited by the Committee to appear at its
seventh meeting, in 1993, to explain their persistent failure to report baseline
data. Six of the countries did so.[69] The discussion and outcomes of those
cases illustrate the problems encountered by the countries that had been most
delinquent with their data. Some were implementing projects to gather the data or
had experienced bureaucratic problems. Five Parties brought the data with them
or submitted the information shortly before the meeting.[70] By inviting these
Parties to explain their behavior, the Committee provided a deadline that probably
helped speed the provision of data.
Some Parties still persistently failed to report data. The Implementation
Committee repeated the exercise at its ninth meeting (October 1994) and invited
seven countries to explain their situations. Two did not appear (Lebanon and
Swaziland). Of the five that attended, three reported that they had recently
submitted the needed data (Algeria, Iran, and Syria). The remaining countries
(Antigua and Barbuda, and Central African Republic) discussed the problems they
had encountered and offered timetables for the full reporting of their data.[71]
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In none of these cases did transparency alone cause significant changes in the
behavior of governments. As a minimum, transparency was backed by critical
discussion, which increased pressure on countries to comply. But these tools have
only limited influence – they have been effective only when the country and its
delegates have been responsive and it has been relatively easy to comply. For
developing countries, the MLF-funded country programs, which include grants to
gather baseline data as well as capacity building to improve the ability of countries
to provide data, have had a much greater influence than the Implementation
Committee.[72] In those few cases where MLF funding has not rapidly improved
the reporting of baseline data, the 1994 Decision of the Meeting of the Parties to
cut off funding has helped to induce compliance. Its direct effect was evident in
the case of Mauritania, and it may deter other Parties from not complying with
the requirement to submit baseline data. Every developing country with a long-
standing MLF country program has now reported its baseline data. Nonetheless,
in 1995 baseline data for the core CFCs and Halons (Annex A) were more than
two years overdue for 15 Parties, all of them developing countries.[73] An
encouraging sign is that most of the delinquents eventually report their data. Only
three countries on the 1995 list had been on the same list in 1994.[74] Only two
of the Parties that the Committee queried about missing data in 1993 needed to
be invited back for another face-to-face inquiry in 1994.
The above cases of non-reporting are extreme examples. The regime faces a
much larger, chronic problem of incomplete and late annual data. In 1994 one-
third of Parties had not reported the required annual data for 1992.[75] In 1995
about half had not reported data for 1993.[76] Developing countries account for
most of the missing annual data, but several industrialized countries have also
failed to report their annual data. If the past is a guide, MLF funding will be most
important in the general improvement of data reporting by developing countries.
The Secretariat and Implementation Committee might play a role in the most
delinquent cases; so far the Implementation Committee has not been active on
this issue.
The influence of the Implementation Committee’s efforts to induce com-
pliance might be multiplied by pressure from environmental nongovernmental
organizations (ENGOs). However, ENGOs are excluded from the Committee’s
deliberations, and there is no evidence that they have been closely observing the
Committee’s actions and reports. Thus, when the Committee or the Secretariat
makes cases of noncompliance transparent, the ENGOs typically are not waiting
in the wings to seize on the information and use it to pressure governments to
comply. The lack of ENGO action in tandem with the Committee reflects that the
Committee has not engaged a single significant issue in a country where ENGOs
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are active domestically on the stratospheric ozone problem (for example, Ger-
many, UK, and USA). In countries with severe compliance problems on which
the Committee has focused its attention and where additional domestic pressure
from ENGOs could be very helpful, ENGOs are largely inactive and are not in-
fluential on the ozone-depletion issue (for example, Russia, Ukraine, and several
developing countries). The exceptions are the EC and perhaps Italy, both of
which have encountered problems reporting data. However, their noncompliance
has reflected problems with the common market and the difficulty of overcoming
domestic bureaucratic obstacles, which are now mostly resolved. Attention from
ENGOs probably would not have been very helpful. Italy has also persistently
failed to pay its contributions to the MLF.[77] However, the Implementation
Committee has never raised any compliance problems related to MLF contribu-
tions. Further, compliance with data reporting is hardly the type of issue typically
championed by ENGOs, especially those that are keen to make public images that
attract dues-paying members. Some ENGOs within industrialized countries have
been active on the dramatic issue of illegal trade in ODS, but that issue has not
been addressed by the Implementation Committee.[78] In short, the Committee’s
influence has not been multiplied by ENGOs, which is a reflection of the countries
and issues that have dominated the agenda thus far and not a suggestion that this
mode of influence is ineffective or unavailable.
Summary on the Committee’s Operation and Effectiveness
Like other subsidiary bodies with good leadership and limited membership, the
Committee has made many contributions by handling issues in a small forum and
then referring them to a larger, more political body for final debate and decisions.
But ultimately the Committee will be judged by whether it helps change the
behavior of Parties that might or have failed to comply with the Protocol.
When countries have found it relatively easy to reverse their noncompliance,
the Committee has been effective in inducing them to do so simply by inform-
ing them of their noncompliance with their obligations. In some instances, the
embarrassment of being identified and questioned as a noncompliant Party by the
Committee has probably resulted in countries’ reporting data more quickly and
completely than they would have otherwise. Nonetheless, the tools available to
the Committee are limited to discussion, making recommendations, and making
noncompliance transparent. Hence, the Committee can only contribute to improv-
ing overall compliance with the Protocol in special ways. Its successes in the most
difficult cases – such as inducing Mauritania and Russia to report data – reflect
the combination of transparency and political or economic pressure. This history
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points to the important role of transparency, discussion, and nonconfrontational
approaches, but it also underscores that on its more difficult issues the Committee
is effective because it can employ some element of critique, confrontation, and
even threats. The “soft” mode of compliance management is made more effective
by the existence of a “hard” edge. Nonetheless, on balance the entire regular
system is substantially less confrontational than dispute management systems; it
operates in the spirit of dispute avoidance.
In addition to its direct and indirect influences, the Committee might have
some additional influence by deterring noncompliance. The Mauritania case
shows that the threat of applying conditionality is serious, which presumably
deters other Parties. But few other Parties will be in the same position because
conditionality applies only to baseline data. The decisions concerning exemption
of trade sanctions show that the Montreal Protocol system is serious about imple-
menting such sanctions against countries that stay outside the regime. (Whether
Parties to the Protocol actually implement the sanctions remains to be seen.) It
is likely that the Committee is influential as a deterrent, but this estimation is
extremely difficult to substantiate with evidence. Assessing the deterrent value
of enforcement systems is a notoriously tricky task, because the actual case load
indicates little about the Procedure’s deterrent value. A procedure that is never
used may be completely ineffective because nobody bothers to use it, or com-
pletely effective as a deterrent and thus is never used because it is never needed.
Procedures that are used frequently may be ineffective and thus face many un-
deterred violations, or effective because they often catch minor problems before
they become more severe. It is likely that the deterrent value of the Committee’s
work is greater when it handles specific cases (e.g., Mauritania) rather than gen-
eralities. But this is a hypothesis, not a fact proved by the experiences under the
Non-Compliance Procedure.
Possible Tougher Responses and Why They Are Not Available
The Committee could have many other tools available, notably some stronger
powers to sanction noncompliance or reward compliance. After the interim Non-
Compliance Procedure was adopted in 1990, the ad hoc Group of Legal Experts on
the Non-Compliance Procedure was instructed to explore possibilities for stronger
options.[79] Despite the goal of a tougher procedure, agreement was possible only
on a weak “indicative list of measures that might be taken by a Meeting of the
Parties in respect of noncompliance with the Protocol” (see Appendix I). The list
includes “positive” incentives as well as punitive measures.
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The “indicative list” appears to have had no effect on the behavior of Parties,
nor will it in the future. Some Parties have referred to it, but only when it serves
their interests.[80] The fact that measures beyond an “indicative list” were not
adopted reflects that the noncompliance system was in its infancy, the subject
was politically sensitive, and the ad hoc group could not agree on whether strict
judgements, implemented through such measures, should be part of the mandate
of the Committee. Once the Committee has discussed a case at length and has
perhaps made some comments in its reports, its avenues for action have nearly
reached a dead end. A case could move to dispute resolution, or Parties could
even pursue dispute resolution in parallel, but if the empty history of multilateral
environmental dispute resolution is a guide, these actions are unlikely.
It is useful to consider some stronger tools and why they are not available
to the Committee, and to speculate on their possible use in the future. Some
observers will surely lament that the Non-Compliance Procedure is not tougher.
This section illustrates why it is not stronger, and in doing so helps to define
some political and practical limits on the power and efficacy of the Procedure and
Committee, and possible similar arrangements in other multilateral environmental
agreements.
First, one should consider the possibility of a closer link with the MLF. A
closer relationship between the bodies could help target funding and other pressure
at countries with compliance problems. Although the Executive Committee of
the MLF and the Implementation Committee keep each other informed of their
activities, in practice MLF funding decisions have been made and monitored
almost entirely by the MLF’s Executive Committee and Secretariat. The beginning
of a closer relationship may be evident in the Implementation Committee’s small
role in creating conditionality between MLF funding and compliance with baseline
data reporting and its role in enforcing that conditionality (i.e., the Mauritania
case).
Given how effective the few existing links have proved, there may be a strong
case for an even closer relationship between these two bodies. Elsewhere in this
essay it is argued that the Implementation Committee should be viewed as part
of a system of institutions that provides credible technical advice, enables rapid
adjustment of the Protocol’s commitments over time, gathers and disseminates
information about implementation, assists countries in paying the costs of im-
plementation, and manages problems of noncompliance as they arise. To the
extent that the system operates synergistically it will be more effective, especially
in managing difficult cases of noncompliance that demand a full range of tools
(i.e., sticks and carrots).[81] A reasonable next step toward integration might
be to create conditionality between MLF funding and the supply of annual data.
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Broader conditionality is already evident elsewhere. Outside the Protocol, the
GEF has made funding of ozone projects in countries with economies in transi-
tion conditional on compliance with the Protocol (and the London Amendment).
More broadly, several multilateral financial institutions, notably the World Bank,
now require recipients to be members of and in compliance with all relevant
multilateral environmental agreements.[82]
However, if broader conditionality is to be developed within the ozone regime,
the debates that led to the existing conditionality for baseline data must be kept
in mind. When forging the conditionality on baseline data, some Implementa-
tion Committee members from developing countries were concerned, with good
reason, that the terms of conditionality not be so strict that they do not reflect
the real difficulties countries face in gathering and reporting data. Donors and
enthusiasts of ozone-layer protection might want to be tough with countries that
do not comply, but in general the experience with conditionality has been mixed
and controversial. Strict efforts to increase conditionality within the Montreal
Protocol could easily entrain the disenchantment, distrust, and evasion that have
characterized conditionality elsewhere, such as in the International Monetary
Fund. The experience so far indicates that the Montreal Protocol has been able to
find reasonable compromises in the application of conditionality. Countries have
one to two years to report baseline data before the threat to cut off MLF funding
is invoked. Based on the current experience with data reporting, allowing up to
a two- or three-year delay in the reporting of annual data would be a reasonable
compromise between the Protocol’s need for prompt data and the Parties’ need
for time to gather the necessary statistics. Nonetheless, conditionality is a highly
imbalanced tool. It is not useful against countries that do not draw resources from
the MLF, yet several such countries have failed to provide annual data on a timely
basis. Further, conditionality is a blunt instrument – useful in extreme cases, but
difficult to apply when Parties are making good-faith efforts to comply but are
encountering unforeseen problems that may require patience and further resources
to correct. In the near future MLF conditionality will not be relevant to cases of
noncompliance with the ODS controls, since by definition those controls have not
taken full effect for any of the countries eligible for MLF funding. But when they
do, it is logical to expect that the possibility of conditionality will also arise in
those cases. Insofar as conditionality is applied, the Implementation Committee
will probably be the arbiter, as it was in the Mauritania case.
If allowed at all, MLF conditionality must be used sparingly. High levels of
membership of developing countries in the Montreal Protocol mainly reflect the
threat of trade sanctions against nonmembers and the existence of the MLF to
pay the incremental costs of compliance. Limiting access to those crucial funds
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could induce a critical group of countries to produce and consume ODS outside
the Montreal Protocol system, undermining the fundamental objectives of the
Protocol. That would be risky for the Parties involved, but the risks of extensive
use of conditionality to the Montreal Protocol are significant as well.
Another stronger power of the Committee could be to interpret (legally or
even politically) the provisions of the Protocol in specific cases. This quasi-
judicial function could lead to a body of “case law” and interpretation. However,
the Fourth Meeting of the Parties reaffirmed that even the legal interpretation of
the Protocol “rests with the Parties themselves.” In particular instances where it
would have been extremely efficient to delegate detailed decision making to the
Committee, even if it did not entail a substantial loss of power by the Meeting of
the Parties, the Meeting of the Parties has underscored its final authority.[83] In
practice the Committee will probably develop a quasi-judicial function, provided
that its recommendations continue to be supported by the Meeting of the Parties.
Recognition of that nascent role is reflected in the decisions by Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, and others to volunteer to discuss their compliance problems with the
Committee and to seek the Committee’s advice on possible next steps.
Ironically, wariness of a powerful Committee may be a direct consequence
of the “strength” of the Montreal Protocol. Many countries, especially in the
developing world, joined the Protocol to avoid the trade sanctions authorized
against non-Parties. But they were and are unsure exactly how they will comply
with their obligations. Furthermore, Parties are prohibited from making any
reservations when they join the Protocol.[84] So far, disbursements from the
MLF have been sufficiently large to fund data collection, capacity building, and
many projects to limit consumption of ODS. But in the future there is some risk that
MLF funding will not be sufficient to support full compliance with the Protocol’s
most stringent commitments to control ODS. In principle, if MLF funding proves
inadequate, developing countries could make their compliance contingent on
the supply of additional MLF resources. In practice, countries that lack strong
domestic support for eliminating ODS are understandably wary of the imposition
of global environmental commitments without the means to comply. This fear is
exacerbated by generally low levels of trust between developed countries (MLF
donors) and developing countries (MLF recipients). Thus, from the outset the
developing countries have been especially wary of a strong Non-Compliance
Procedure and of efforts to develop excessive levels of conditionality.
Both these elements – the lack of reservations and the inclusion of trade sanc-
tions – are often identified as reasons the Protocol is strong and reasons its example
should be followed in other areas. However, if difficult noncompliance problems
become more numerous and the Implementation Committee remains weak, these
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features of the ozone regime may be seen as sources of weakness because they
weaken the noncompliance system. If the Montreal Protocol experience is to be
applied to other regimes, it could be valuable to consider integrating the design
of the procedure more closely with the negotiations over substantive commit-
ments. In practice there was some connection in the Montreal Protocol, because
the Procedure was elaborated in parallel with negotiations on the 1990 and 1992
amendments and adjustments. But as Sze´ll has pointed out, the Non-Compliance
Procedure is part of a package of negotiated commitments that, together, make up
the obligations of the Montreal Protocol.[85] Leaving noncompliance procedures
to be negotiated after the substantive commitments have been decided may tend
to yield weak procedures, especially if substantive commitments are stringent. In
the Montreal Protocol, the design of the Procedure was deferred because there was
not enough time in Montreal to resolve the issue; however, making these kinds
of deferrals a general practice may, on balance, lead to less effective multilateral
environmental agreements.
4
The First Cases Under the Ad Hoc System
The Implementation Committee, with the same tools at its disposal, handles cases
under the ad hoc system. In 1995 that system was invoked for the first time to
handle formal submissions of noncompliance. The submissions concerned the
imminent failure to comply with the Protocol by five countries with economies in
transition: Belarus, Bulgaria, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine (the BBPRU submis-
sions). Some observers maintained that some of these countries, notably Russia,
already were not in compliance with the Protocol’s interim reduction targets (the
existing ban on Halon consumption) and were also supplying an illegal trade in
ODS. However, data submitted by all five show that they were in compliance.
Thus the formal submissions concern only these countries’ failure to comply with
the Protocol after 1 January 1996, when they were to have eliminated essentially
all consumption of the 15 most noxious CFCs, carbon tetrachloride, and methyl
chloroform.
The five Parties, led by Russia, originally intended to submit their request for
a special five-year grace period directly to the Meeting of the Parties.[86] Instead,
their request was rerouted through the Implementation Committee, which declared
them as “submissions” under paragraph 4 of the Procedure, which allows a Party
to make submissions concerning its own noncompliance.[87] In other words,
the five countries “accused” themselves of noncompliance. As mentioned above,
before the ad hoc system was invoked, four of the five countries (all except
Bulgaria) had already been in front of the Committee to discuss their probable
noncompliance with the Protocol’s controls on ODS. Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine
had been questioned by the Committee about their failures to report baseline data.
Russia did not report the full baseline data required by the Protocol until after the
BBPRU submissions were lodged and such data were absolutely required before
the Committee would approve the Russian compliance plan.
The BBPRU submissions are not yet fully resolved, but they are on track
for an even-handed assessment based primarily on an objective evaluation of the
facts and circumstances of each country. That might not have been true had the
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matter been handled entirely within the more political Meeting of the Parties, as
Russia had originally intended. That the Implementation Committee was given
the task of handling these submissions under the Non-Compliance Procedure is
one measure of its reputation as the legitimate and competent forum for handling
such matters.
The Committee has wisely divided the omnibus submission into individual
submissions. Two of the Parties (Poland and Bulgaria) may find it possible to
comply with the Protocol in 1996; if not, their cases will be reviewed later. The
other three Parties (Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine) have been instructed to develop
plans to achieve compliance with the Protocol. As of this writing, each country
has submitted a plan. However, the Implementation Committee has deemed
each compliance plan inadequate and has asked each Party to both provide more
details on technical aspects and clarify its political commitment to comply with
the Protocol. The Implementation Committee has responsed to each country’s
situation by focusing on working with the country to achieve compliance with the
Protocol as rapidly as possible. Rather than tailor the Protocol to the Party, the
Party is to bring its performance back to the Protocol’s standards, with periodic
reviews along the way. The approach aims at solving problems rather than
apportioning blame or taking enforcement actions.
The BBPRU submissions and planned reviews of each Party’s situation in-
volve technical issues beyond the competence of the members of the Committee.
For these submissions the Committee has had the advice of a special Technology
and Economic Assessment Panel (TEAP) on countries with economies in tran-
sition.[88] TEAP experts have been active participants in the deliberations of
the Committee concerning these submissions. This panel is one of several expert
groups that provide legitimate, useful, and timely advice to the ozone regime.
The Implementation Committee presented its approach to the Meeting of the
Parties, which adopted the Committee’s recommendations as formal Decisions
mostly intact. The one significant exception concerns the Committee’s proposed
ban on some exports of ODS from Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. Belarus and
Ukraine, with no domestic production of ODS or recovery and recycling facilities,
agreed with the Implementation Committee to stop exports. However, as permit-
ted by the Protocol, Russia intended to continue exports to developing countries
for “basic domestic needs” and to develop an ODS recovery and recycling in-
dustry. Some developing countries, concerned about Russian ODS exports to
lucrative markets in the developing world, sought to strengthen the ban. But the
result of their revisions to the Decision is more ambiguous wording that bans the
re-export of Russian production through other members of the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS), including Belarus and Ukraine. The Decision does
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not explicitly ban Russian direct exports for the “basic domestic needs” of devel-
oping countries. Russia must still submit information on recovery and recycling
facilities if it wants such production to comply with the Protocol’s requirements,
but such information is required of any Party that engages in recovery and re-
cycling. Trade among CIS members is allowed; their economies remain closely
interlinked, despite the collapse of the Soviet Union.[89] These three Decisions
set a framework for handling likely submissions by other CIS Parties.
Although the BBPRU cases are examples of self-accusation, in none of the
countries was the submission an entirely voluntary act. Funding needed for those
countries to comply has been allocated by the GEF. However, before the GEF
would approve additional projects in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, it sought broad
approval of these countries’ compliance plans by the Implementation Committee
and the Meeting of the Parties. Although the GEF has no official role within the
Montreal Protocol’s system of institutions, in general it sees its role as supporting
the funding of projects that contribute to the compliance and effectiveness of
relevant international environmental agreements. Because none of the countries
with economies in transition is a “developing country,” none is eligible for MLF
funding. Thus, the GEF has identified these countries as its niche for funding of
stratospheric ozone projects. (Stratospheric ozone depletion is one of four priority
areas for GEF funding.)
Although the GEF will provide the funding, the Implementation Committee
will continue to play a central role in regularly reviewing progress and dealing
with compliance issues as they arise. The Decisions pertaining to Belarus, Russia,
and Ukraine each state that, “[i]n case of any questions related to the reporting
requirements and the actions [of Belarus, Russia, or Ukraine], the disbursement of
the international assistance should be contingent on the settlement of those prob-
lems with the Implementation Committee.”[90] Speaking to the Implementation
Committee, a GEF representative underscored that “GEF funding was subject to
the formal processes of the Montreal Protocol for noncompliance.” Also, “GEF
was awaiting the advice of the Implementation Committee as to the quality of
the Russian Federation’s submissions    before proceeding with a project for the
Russian Federation.”[91] Thus, in practice the system of integrated institutions
extends even beyond the formal boundaries of the Montreal Protocol. The Com-
mittee serves as the arbiter of conditionality between these countries’ compliance
and the supply of GEF funding. This model is promising, but it does not indicate
how compliance problems will be handled in developing countries, which are
suspicious of the conditionality and will draw their funding from the MLF, not
the GEF.
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By far the most difficult of the BBPRU cases has been that of Russia. Many
observers are privately skeptical of the accuracy of the Russian data, but there are
no independent means to verify them and there are many other more important
aspects of the Russian situation. One is concern that Russia will not implement
the full phaseout, even within its proposed five-year period. But most important
is the problem of trade. Russia is the only major CFC producer of the former
Soviet Union, and it had been planning to recover, recycle, and sell ODS in
foreign markets to earn hard currency. The Decision by the Meeting of the Parties
may limit that lucrative trade. Russia’s strong objections to that ban led to the
unusual outcome that the Decision was adopted “by consensus” with one Party
(Russia) dissenting.[92] Whether Russia’s dissent matters is unclear. While the
Decision instructs Russia to control these exports, it also legitimizes efforts by
other countries to ban imports from Russia. Given the already lax Russian export
controls, it may be the import controls that matter most.
Interestingly, depending on how the ambiguous Decision is interpreted, this is
the first time that substantial trade sanctions have been applied within the Montreal
Protocol regime. It is a blessing to the Implementation Committee, the GEF, and
others interesting in inducing Russian compliance that Russia is not a member
of the World Trade Organization (WTO). If it were, it might initiate a dispute
to challenge the trade restrictions. That scenario has long been feared by those
who advocate using trade sanctions in environmental agreements; compatibility
of such measures with the free trade–oriented WTO rules remains unclear, but
this problem does not arise when trading outside the WTO membership.
5
Systematic Analysis of Trends in the
Work of the Committee
In the previous sections the operation and effectiveness of the Implementation
Committee were analyzed, using as illustrations the particular issues it has han-
dled. Here, an effort is made to analyze all of the work of the Committee
systematically and to provide a quantitative assessment of how the Committee’s
agenda has changed over time.
Two major classes of questions motivate this systematic analysis. First,
most analysts have informally claimed that the Implementation Committee has
primarily dealt with issues related to the reporting of data. The analysis above
suggests the same. But, is this true? To what degree are other issues also being
addressed, and is the subject matter shifting? Second, are there trends in the
balance of the Committee’s work between general issues and those specific to
particular countries?
Answers to the first questions are important because they indicate the extent
to which lessons from this experience are limited to noncompliance procedures
that deal with data reporting; visions of noncompliance procedures for other
environmental agreements include the hope that they will address problems of
noncompliance that are more difficult than those concerning data reporting. If the
Montreal Protocol experience is mainly limited to data reporting, then its lessons
may be similarly limited.
Answering the second question is important because noncompliance pro-
cedures (and other systems for compliance supervision) may be most effective
when they address specific cases of noncompliance. Deterrence is more effective
if individual Parties fear that they will be individually called to account for their
actions. The recommendations developed by the Committee will be more precise
and effective if they are based on specific experience. If these benefits are attrac-
tive to the designers of noncompliance procedures, then it is important to know
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whether (and why) the Implementation Committee’s work load has evolved over
time to focus on country-specific cases.
Method
Discussion of the substantive matters in each of the 12 Committee reports was
coded into one of four categories.[93]
 Matters of noncompliance related to reporting and availability of data
1. General discussions
2. Country-specific discussions or deliberations initiated by the situation
of a specific country
 Matters of noncompliance except the reporting and availability of data
3 General discussions
4 Country-specific discussions or deliberations initiated by the situation
of a specific country
Coding was done by hand by the author; copies of the coded Committee reports
are available for inspection. The number of lines in Committee reports devoted
to each category were then counted and tabulated.
Results and Implications
Figure 1 shows the tabulated results of the substantive analysis (raw data are
reproduced in Appendix II).
Although it is difficult to identify robust trends after only 12 meetings, three
findings are evident from the data. First, the bulk of the Committee’s work
has been general and has concerned data reporting (see Figure 1). Since the
third meeting, the attention given to general matters of data collection has been
relatively constant, largely because each meeting includes a section (of fairly
constant length) in which the Secretariat gives a summary of the state of data
reporting. The bulk of the Secretariat’s report is general; specific countries are
mentioned, usually in lists, but most of the discussion does not result in a focus on
particular countries or in asking countries to explain why they have not reported
their data.[94] The conventional wisdom that much of the Committee’s first four
years was spent on data reporting is correct.
Second, whereas the general attention to data reporting has been relatively
constant since 1992, attention to country-specific aspects of data reporting has
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increased (see Figure 1). The Committee began with a loose mandate; it started
by addressing those issues of noncompliance that were most immediate for the
Protocol, data reporting, and did so in a general way. But that system has evolved,
developing the capacity to deal with specific issues as well. It is encouraging
that this shift to case-specific issues took place in 1993 and 1994, under the
regular system and before any formal cases of noncompliance were raised. The
Committee has been able to evolve on its own to handle a wider range of issues.
Third, since late in 1993 the Committee has increasingly addressed matters
of potential noncompliance that are unrelated to data reporting. Essentially, all
of this attention has come in the form of country-specific discussions, primarily
concerning countries with economies in transition (see Figure 1).[95] In the most
recent meetings, the majority of the Committee’s attention has been devoted to
the ad hoc procedure (see data in Appendix II).
As the agenda has shifted from data issues, the work of the Committee has
increasingly reflected what the affected Parties themselves want to discuss. The
analysis in the previous two sections has shown that most data-related issues have
been placed on the agenda of the Committee at the instigation of the Secretariat,
Committee, or other bodies of the Montreal Protocol system. In contrast, practi-
cally all issues related to compliance with ODS controls have been placed on the
Committee’s agenda by the affected Parties.
6
Conclusions and Some Implications
for Other Noncompliance Procedures
The Montreal Protocol Implementation Committee is the only functioning non-
compliance procedure in a major international environmental agreement. Con-
sequently, much attention has been given to it as a model for similar procedures
envisioned in other agreements. This paper offers the first independent analysis
of its short history.
Until the last two years, the Non-Compliance Procedure did not have a
clear position within the Montreal Protocol’s system of institutions.[96] Now its
legitimacy and influence are growing. In the past its relative obscurity gave it
control over its agenda, but more and more the Committee is being asked by other
bodies of the Montreal Protocol system to consider issues. Increasingly, Parties
also seek the Committee’s advice on compliance problems. Today the Committee
is the legitimate “first stop“ in any formal discussion within the Montreal Protocol
on matters related to compliance.
This study shows that the Committee has had some influence in getting coun-
tries to report data as required by the Protocol. But its influence has been most
evident when countries have found it relatively easy to comply. Because its pow-
ers are quite limited, the Committee has had less success in inducing compliance
in cases where gathering and reporting data has been difficult, primarily in devel-
oping countries and a few economies in transition, notably Russia. Regarding data
reporting from developing countries, the MLF and its implementing agencies now
have many projects under way to help these countries improve their capacities
to report. Essentially all efforts to identify and manage these projects are made
within the MLF, its implementing agencies, and the Parties. The Implementation
Committee plays almost no role. The MLF, implementing agencies, and Commit-
tee exchange information, but there is little if any change in what the MLF and
agencies support as a consequence of the issues brought before the Committee.
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Increasingly, the Committee has addressed issues beyond data reporting,
notably, compliance with the Protocol’s obligations to control ODS. Nearly all
have consisted of specific concerns about compliance by a particular Party. All
of those issues have been put on the Committee’s agenda by the affected Party.
For five years, from 1990 to 1995, the Committee worked solely as a standing
body that handled issues that it, other bodies, the Secretariat, and Parties thought
would be useful to address. This essay includes a quantitative analysis that
confirms three clear trends in the Committee’s work load: (a) until recently most
attention was given to compliance with the Protocol’s data reporting requirements;
(b) although the Committee regularly handles general compliance issues, there
has been a consistent increase in attention to the compliance problems of specific
parties; and (c) nearly all of the issues related to ODS controls handled by the
Committee have concerned specific problems encountered by specific Parties.
This essay argues that the Committee plays its most unique role, and has its
greatest influence on compliance, by handling specific cases. These trends in its
work load are an encouraging sign that the Committee is responsive to changes in
the compliance issues that are the most relevant to the Protocol, and over time it
has sought to increase its effectiveness.
In 1995 the Committee heard the first cases lodged under the ad hoc system
by Belarus, Bulgaria, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine. In handling those cases,
which are still under way, the Committee has adopted a pragmatic, problem-
oriented approach. It has focused on ways to achieve compliance, requiring each
Party that is not in compliance (currently only Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine) to
document its plans for complying with the Protocol. The Committee will review
these plans periodically and stand ready to handle any issues that may arise. The
GEF will provide the main multilateral financial assistance.
This essay analyzes the regular and ad hoc systems separately in order
to explore their differences, which will aid in applying lessons from this ex-
perience to other regimes that include both regular and ad hoc systems. But there
are many commonalities. Both the ad hoc and regular systems have the same basis
in law (the Non-Compliance Procedure) and are managed by the same institutions
(the Implementation Committee and Secretariat). The tools that the Committee
uses to handle both its regular work load and ad hoc cases are the same. These
commonalities have been important – the Committee’s work as a standing body
over five years built legitimacy and competence that improved its ability to handle
the first ad hoc submissions. In the future, the Committee’s work as a standing
body may be more influential because it has handled the first ad hoc submissions
well.
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The work of the Committee probably has a wider effect deterring noncom-
pliance, but that has been difficult to substantiate. Both the handling of specific
noncompliance problems and deterrence require the ability to detect noncompli-
ance, which in turn requires accurate and complete data. The Committee has
helped improve the reporting of missing data. So far, it has given little attention
to the more difficult task of assessing and improving data quality.
This history suggests some detailed lessons for the design of similar pro-
cedures in other regimes, such as in the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal and under
Article 13 of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC).
 The standing committee has been valuable because it has been able to handle
issues even without the formal “submission” system’s being invoked. A
standing committee, backed by an active Secretariat, can help handle the
easier issues. The Montreal Protocol experience also shows that a standing
committee can build expertise and legitimacy, which are useful assets once
difficult issues of noncompliance arrive on its agenda.
 The Committee’s work has been much more focused when dealing with
specific cases of noncompliance. Although some hope that noncompliance
procedures will be nonconfrontational, the history here suggests that friendly
confrontation is beneficial. Asking Parties to explain their noncompliance,
which can be confrontational, is what gives the Non-Compliance Procedure
its focus and relevance.
 The Committee’s mandate is mainly to address matters of compliance. Thus
the treaty commitments are important in determining when the Committee
is activated, especially when serious matters of compliance are addressed
through the ad hoc procedure. Clarity of commitments may be needed for
a similar body to contribute to the FCCC, where commitments to control
greenhouse gases are currently ambiguous. That does not forestall creating a
standing committee that might handle the clear existing commitment to report
data, but if compliance is a goal for the future in the climate treaty there must
be some way to assess what is and is not compliance.
 Governments wanted Parties, not individuals, to have seats on the Imple-
mentation Committee. This does not rule out the possibility of amending
the Procedure to allow roles for individual experts sometime in the future,
such as on panels to hear specific cases. Further, the Committee and Parties
appear comfortable with the exclusion of non-Parties (e.g., NGOs), which
is somewhat opposed to general trends in formal bodies attached to other
international environmental agreements, where expanded NGO access has
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been the norm. This decision was made to allow frank discussion of issues
among diplomats.
If the designers of other noncompliance procedures intend to create mecha-
nisms capable of efficiently handling difficult cases of noncompliance, they should
use caution in drawing lessons from the operation of the Montreal Protocol’s ex-
perience. The Protocol’s noncompliance system has not often been used to handle
difficult problems of noncompliance; its ad hoc “submissions” system is being
used only now for the first time. Efforts to give it more extensive powers that
might be needed to handle difficult cases have been rejected. Links between the
Committee and the MLF and its implementing agencies, which could give the
Committee more influence and leverage, are relatively weak but appear to be
growing. A recent decision to cut off MLF funding to Parties that persistently fail
to report data represents one of the Committee’s toughest tools, but that applies
only to baseline data, which are relatively easy to report once an MLF program is
in place.
Many observers of the Montreal Protocol see the stringent targets for abate-
ment of ODS, wide participation of industrialized and developing countries, pro-
hibition against reservations, and the inclusion of trade sanctions as sources of
strength. Yet these strong commitments may be directly responsible for the weak-
ness of the Implementation Committee’s mandate. Patrick Sze´ll, chairman of the
ad hoc group that designed and elaborated the Non-Compliance Procedure, sug-
gests that the experience of the Montreal Protocol illustrates an inverse correlation
between the strictness of supervision and the stringency of its substantive obli-
gations.[97] The analysis here supports that claim. The weak Non-Compliance
Procedure stems mostly from the participation of countries that were unsure
whether they would be able to implement the substantive obligations, and thus
were wary of stringent supervision. The same experience need not repeat it-
self in other regimes: strong commitments can and often must go hand in hand
with strong compliance controls. The design of the Montreal Protocol’s Non-
Compliance Procedure underscores that compliance systems must be debated and
designed in the larger context of the commitments of an international agreement.
Commitments and institutions for managing compliance are a package. It might
be valuable to allow some relief to Parties once the Implementation Committee
has gone through a series of direct exchanges with the relevant Party on the rele-
vant topic. The prospects for relief may reduce the understandable conservatism
adopted by countries that are wary of being constrained by compliance control
and thus wary of more stringent noncompliance procedures.
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To close, it must be underscored that throughout its history, the Committee’s
approach has been pragmatic.[98] Its aim has been to cooperate with Parties to find
ways to achieve compliance, rather than to adjudicate and apportion blame. This
approach is one way it differs from traditional dispute resolution and is part of the
reason the Committee and Procedure have been active. They improve compliance
by operating in the realm between mere peer pressure (which is often ineffective in
ensuring compliance) and abrasive dispute resolution (which is never used).[99]
The pragmatic approach raises many questions about traditional concepts of state
responsibility for compliance under international law.[100] So far, however, the
approach seems to contribute to the effectiveness of the Protocol.
To some degree, “temporary relief” has been the Committee’s pragmatic
approach in the BBPRU submissions. As long as the countries are implementing
their agreed plans to comply with the Protocol, less attention is being focused on
their formal status of noncompliance. This pragmatic, solution-oriented approach
is one reason the Non-Compliance Procedure has been used actively and is a
model for cautious application elsewhere.
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[5] In addition to the Montreal Protocol’s Non-Compliance Procedure, Sand’s com-
prehensive review of international environmental agreements mentions two other
systems with a similar function of handling cases of suspected noncompliance: the
system for discussing noncompliance under the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species (CITES); and the European Community’s (EC) enforcement
of the Single European Act. Each procedure is different from the noncompliance
procedure discussed in this paper. The CITES system is operated by the CITES
Secretariat. Information on approximately 100 cases of noncompliance per year is
transmitted by the Secretariat to the CITES Conference of the Parties: no standing
Committee of Parties is dedicated to case-by-case discussions, review, or recom-
mendations for action. The EC system is special because the enforcement powers
of the EC are much greater than those of any of the other international bodies that
typically manage multilateral environmental agreements. See Sand, op. cit., note
[3], p. 14.
[6] Sze´ll, P., 1995, The development of multilateral mechanisms for monitoring com-
pliance, in W. Lang, ed., Sustainable Development and International Law, Graham
and Trotman, London, UK, pp. 97–109. See also Sze´ll, P., 1996, Implementation
control: Non-compliance procedure and dispute settlement in the ozone regime,
in W. Lang, ed., The Ozone Treaties and Their Influence on the Building of Envi-
ronmental Regimes, Austrian Foreign Policy Documentation, Austrian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Vienna, Austria.
[7] For reflection on the early experience under the Non-Compliance Procedure by
the president of the Implementation Committee, see Schally, H.M., 1996, The role
and importance of implementation monitoring and non-compliance procedures in
international environmental regimes, in W. Lang, ed., The Ozone Treaties and Their
Influence on the Building of Environmental Regimes, Austrian Foreign Policy Doc-
umentation, Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, Austria. For discussion
on some important legal implications, see Koskenniemi, M., 1993, Breach of treaty
or non-compliance? Reflections on the enforcement of the Montreal Protocol, in
G. Handl, ed., Yearbook of International Environmental Law, Graham and Trot-
man/Martinus Nijhoff, London, UK, pp. 123–162. In addition, one other published
article addresses this topic, but it is substantially less informative than the ac-
counts by Sze´ll (see note [6]) and Koskenniemi: see Trask, J., 1992, Montreal
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Protocol Non-Compliance Procedure: The best approach to resolving international
environmental disputes, The Georgetown Law Journal, 80:1973–2001.
[8] Background interviews.
[9] Article 8 states, “The Parties, at their first meeting, shall consider and approve
procedures and institutional mechanisms for determining non-compliance with
the provisions of this Protocol and for treatment of Parties found to be in non-
compliance.”
[10] Decision I/8.
[11] Patrick J. Sze´ll, interview with author, London, UK, 20 June 1995.
[12] Decision II/5.
[13] Patrick J. Sze´ll, interview with author, London, UK, 20 June 1995. To allow
continued consideration of the issues, the Second and Third Meetings of the Parties
both gave the ad hoc group a mandate to keep working on a revised, final Non-
Compliance Procedure. Decisions II/5 and III/2.
[14] Decision IV/5.
[15] Patrick J. Sze´ll, interview with author, London, UK, 20 June 1995.
[16] Background interviews.
[17] See primarily Sze´ll op. cit., note [6], and Koskenniemi, op. cit., note [7].
[18] Patrick J. Sze´ll, interview with author, London, UK, 20 June 1995.
[19] The Convention’s dispute resolution system also applies to the Montreal Protocol.
All Parties to a protocol to the Convention must be Parties to the Convention
(Article 16 of the Convention); the provisions of the Convention that relate to its
protocols apply to the Montreal Protocol (Article 14 of the Montreal Protocol); and
the Convention’s dispute resolution system applies to its protocols (Article 11.6 of
the Convention).
[20] Paragraph 3 of the Non-Compliance Procedure. The Secretariat does not have a
strict obligation to report possible noncompliance. If the Secretariat becomes aware
of possible noncompliance, “it may request the Party concerned to furnish neces-
sary information about the matter. If there is no response from the Party concerned
within three months or such longer period as the circumstances of the matter may
require    then the Secretariat shall include the matter in its report to the Meeting
of the Parties    and inform the Implementation Committee accordingly.” The
Secretariat has never formally asked a Party for information about its noncom-
pliance while operating under this paragraph of the Non-Compliance Procedure.
Thus, while the Secretariat (and everyone) is aware of some noncompliance, it has
never requested the “necessary information,” therefore, the Secretariat has not been
compelled to initiate the Procedure under this paragraph. If the Secretariat were to
provide such information to the Implementation Committee, it would not formally
be labeled a “submission.” In practice, the formal label probably does not matter.
[21] Paragraph 2 of the Non-Compliance Procedure.
[22] See Romano, op. cit., note [4].
[23] Hugo M. Schally, interview with author, Vienna, Austria, June 1995. Schally was
president for the two years at the end of the period covered in this study. During that
time the Committee’s work load and role within the Montreal Protocol’s system
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of institutions increased dramatically. In March 1996 a representative from Peru
(Antonio Garcia Revilla) became president of the Implementation Committee.
[24] Background interviews.
[25] UNEP/ImpCom/12/3 (1 December 1995), p. 10.
[26] Decision I/11 requires the Secretariat to ensure that confidential data are not dis-
closed, except to Parties that have guaranteed in writing that they will not disclose
such data. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Non-Compliance Procedure require the
Committee and any Party involved in its deliberations to protect the confidentiality
of information they receive in confidence.
[27] Nearly all countries have classified as “confidential” almost all their data on pro-
duction of the main chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and Halons (listed in Annexes A
and B). In practice, all data on production and trade are treated as confidential by
the Secretariat, whose regular compilation of data (see notes [28] and [29] and
accompanying text infra) reports national production and consumption for groups
of substances, not for each of the controlled substances individually. The compro-
mise on confidential data is to require such data where needed but to ensure their
confidentiality by not publishing such data in public reports and by demanding that
all Parties keep such data in confidence. Although the Committee’s report must not
contain confidential data, all data (including confidential data) that are exchanged
in relation to any recommendation of the Committee must be made available to
any Party that requests them; that Party, in turn, must ensure that the data remain
in confidence (see paragraph 16 of the Non-Compliance Procedure). It is unclear
whether Parties are convinced that the system for exchanging confidential data is
secure, although so far it has not been tested. In the Montreal Protocol in general,
the handling of confidential data does not appear to have caused major problems –
the lack of reported data is much more serious than their confidentiality.
[28] Article 7. Most of the Protocol’s control measures are expressed in terms of a
group of substances (e.g., Group I of Annex A), but data are required for each
controlled substance individually, because the group is computed by weighting
production, imports, and exports of each controlled substance according to its
ozone-depleting potential (ODP). Production, import, and export data are required
because the control measures in the Protocol are defined in terms of consumption
of controlled substances. Consumption is calculated according to the following
formula: production + imports exports. The procedure for weighting substances
and computing consumption is described in Article 3.
Parties are also required to submit data on the amounts used for feedstocks,
amounts destroyed by approved technologies, and imports from and exports to
Parties and non-Parties, respectively (Article 7.3). Data are required for imports
of some recycled substances (Article 7.3 bis). Regional economic integration
organizations may comply with all the export and import data requirements by
providing data on exports and imports between the organization and States that
are not members of the organization (Article 7.4). Such organizations must still
provide national data on production.
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The exact data-reporting requirements depend on the particular situation of
the country, as there are now three versions of the Protocol in force: the original
Protocol (1987), the London Amendment (1990), and the Copenhagen Amendment
(1992). Not all Parties have ratified all amendments. Each amendment has ex-
panded the list of controlled substances, and thus each has expanded the reporting
requirements.
Baseline years are 1986 for the core CFCs and Halons, listed in Annex A;
1989 for the other CFCs, carbon tetrachloride, and methyl chloroform, listed in
Annex B; 1989 for the “transitional” HCFCs and HBFCs and their isomers, listed
in Annex C; and 1991 for methyl bromide, listed in Annex E. The baseline years
are specified with the control measures (Article 2) and repeated in the Articles on
reporting of data (Articles 7.1 and 7.2).
[29] At present, the most recent of the Secretariat’s annual reports on data (required by
Article 12.c of the Protocol) is UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/6 (25 September 1995).
[30] The Protocol was amended in 1990 to allow the EC and other “Regional Economic
Integration Organizations” to report only imports and exports between the Orga-
nization and states that are not members of the organization. This issue does not
arise for other Parties, because the EC is the only Party with the status of Regional
Economic Integration Organization under the Protocol. The confidentiality issue,
which has been a concern for members outside the EC, is handled by allowing data
to be submitted on a confidential basis and by requiring the Secretariat to aggregate
some data in its public reports to obscure commercially sensitive information.
[31] Data reporting by Belarus, Italy, and Ukraine was discussed at the seventh meeting.
See UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/7/2 (16 November 1993), pp. 2–5.
[32] See UNEP/OzL.Pro.6/5 (15 July 1994).
[33] Article 10 mentions financial assistance from the MLF for developing countries.
Article 5 mentions lenient provisions for controlling consumption of ODS.
[34] That main definition is in paragraph 1 of Article 5. This paragraph sets a consump-
tion threshold at 0.3 kg per capita for the core five CFCs and three Halons (listed in
Annex A and weighted according to ODP) on the date of entry into force for that
particular Party, or any time thereafter until 1 January 1999.
[35] Decision I/12 E. This list consists of all countries of the UN minus OECD members
(in 1989), minus a few special cases (e.g., Israel, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and South
Africa), and minus all the economies in transition (except Albania, Romania, and
Yugoslavia, which are perhaps economies in transition but are included on the list).
Turkey, an OECD member but classified as a developing country by the World
Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), was added to this
list in 1991 (Decision III/5). Mexico is on the list although it has since joined the
OECD (1995). The Meeting of the Parties requested that a working group further
define criteria to determine what is a “developing country” (Decision III/5). That
group made little progress, and the Meeting has decided to handle requests for
developing country status on a case-by-case basis (Decision IV/7).
[36] UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/4/2, 6 October 1993, p. 2–3.
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[37] Twelfth Meeting of the Implementation Committee, UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/12/3
(1 December 1995 – advance copy), p. 9. The Lebanese challenged the UN data by
presenting alternative population estimates from the World Bank; Decision VII/20.
[38] Where Parties do not have actual data for a year they may use “the best possible
estimates.” See Articles 7.1 and 7.2.
[39] However, the “sense” that data had been manipulated for the purpose of putting
a country below the threshold identified in paragraph 1 of Article 5 led some
members of the Implementation Committee to argue strongly that rules about
data correction be put in place to protect against such manipulation, especially
where changes in data would modify the status of a country under Article 5. See
UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/8/3 (4 July 1994), p. 10.
[40] Their recommendations were adopted by the Meeting of the Parties in 1991. On that
basis, Bahrain, Malta, Singapore, and United Arab Emirates were all temporarily
categorized as not operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5. Decision III/3.
[41] UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/8/3 (4 July 1994), pp. 9–11. The Committee was con-
sidering an issue on the agenda of the Open-Ended Working Group, the main
intersessional working group that prepares issues for handling by the Meeting of
the Parties.
[42] See Decision VI/5 (c).
[43] Article 8. The specific trade restrictions have been expanded in tandem with the
addition of new controlled substances in the 1990 and 1992 amendments to the
Protocol. Thus the specific application of the trade restrictions depends on which
substance is concerned as well as the applicable amendment.
[44] This formal exception is listed in Article 4.8 and elaborated in Decision IV/17 C.
[45] UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/6/3 (26 August 1993), p. 5.
[46] Initially, the formal name was the Interim Multilateral Fund; after its first three
years of operation, the Fund was renewed and made permanent and is now called
the Multilateral Fund. (Hereafter, both are simply referred to as the Multilateral
Fund, MLF.) The implementing agencies are the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), the Industry and Environment Programme Activity Centre
(IE/PAC) of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and the World Bank. These agen-
cies and the MLF were first invited to attend the fourth meeting of the Committee,
September 1992.
[47] Hugo M. Schally, interview with author, Vienna, Austria, June, 1995. UNEP/OzL.
Pro/ImpCom/9/2, pp. 4–6.
[48] Decision VI/5.
[49] UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/12/3 (1 December 1995), p. 2, with reference to Decision
VI/5.
[50] See the report from the Seventh Meeting of the Parties: UNEP/OzLPro.7/12 (27
December 1995), p. 23.
[51] The provisions are given, respectively, in (1) Article 2B and Group II of Annex A;
(2) Article 2A and Group I of Annex A (the core five CFCs); Article 2C and Group
I of Annex B (an additional list of 10 CFCs); Article 2D and Group II of Annex B
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(carbon tetrachloride); Article 2E and Group III of Annex B (methyl chloroform);
(3) Article 2F and Group I of Annex C; (4) Article 2G and Group II of Annex C;
and (5) Article 2H and Annex E.
[52] UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12 (27 December 1995), pp. 60–62.
[53] Parson, E.A., and Greene, O., 1995, The complex chemistry of the international
ozone agreements, Environment, 37:16–20 and 35–43.
[54] Ibid.
[55] UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/9/2 (5 October 1994), p. 7.
[56] Romania thought that it potentially possessed excess quotas, in part because it was
treated as a developing country under Article 5 and thus had lenient controls on
ODS and found it easy to over-comply. The case was deferred to the next meeting
of the Committee, but it was never raised again by Romania or Greece and has not
yet been resolved. See UNEP/OzL.Pro/9/3, pp. 6–7.
[57] UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/7/2, p. 5.
[58] The Implementation Committee decided to seek more information from Lithuania
and pointed out that Lithuania would not gain assistance from international financial
institutions for projects concerning ODS unless it ratified the London Amendment.
The GEF has made membership in and compliance with relevant international
agreements a condition for receipt of GEF money. UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/12/3
(1 December 1995), pp. 9–10.
[59] Cyprus, Kuwait, Lebanon, Slovenia, and the United Arab Emirates. UNEP/OzL.Pro/
ImpCom/10/4 (30 August 1995), pp. 3, 5–6.
[60] The current status of fund contributions is in the report of the MLF’s Executive
Committee: UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/18/75 (24 November 1995), Annex I.
[61] UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/7/2 (16 November 1993).
[62] Paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Non-Compliance Procedure.
[63] The Committee also makes recommendations to the Executive Committee of the
MLF, the only other body within the Montreal Protocol that has decision-making
authority.
[64] These arguments are developed at length in Chayes, A., and Chayes, A.H., 1995,
The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, USA.
[65] The statement of the Russian Federation in the eighth meeting (UNEP/OzL.Pro/Imp
Com/8/3, 4 July 1994, p. 12) indicates that Russia intended to request from the
Meeting of the Parties a special status until 1998. At that same meeting, Ukraine
sent a letter saying that it and other countries in transition would seek “flexi-
bility in the application of the Protocol.” For discussion of Poland’s possible
compliance problems, see note [55] and text supra. At the seventh meeting
(UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/7/2, 16 November 1993, p. 4), Belarus reported that
it would have problems meeting some of the requirements of the Protocol, espe-
cially the rapid phaseout of Halons. The matter was also supposed to be discussed
in the ninth Committee meeting (UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/9/2, 5 October 1994),
but Russia did not attend although it was both a member of the Committee and had
its own business before the Committee. The next year (1995), Russia submitted
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its request for leniency to the OEWP that was preparing for the Meeting of the
Parties; that request was declared a “self-submission” and the BBPRU submissions
were formally under way by the tenth meeting of the Implementation Committee
(UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/10/4, 30 August 1995, p. 6).
[66] Furthermore, it is unclear if Russia (and perhaps Ukraine) would have even dis-
cussed noncompliance with the Committee had a representative from Russia not
been a member of the Committee and therefore both informed about the operation
of the Committee and given abundant opportunity to present his views because he
was already planning to attend the meetings. The experience suggests that it may
be valuable if some Committee members come from countries that are likely to
face problems of noncompliance, and thus are on hand to present their views and
intimate knowledge of the problems as necessary.
[67] Paragraphs 9 and 14 of the Non-Compliance Procedure (see Appendix I).
[68] At its fifth meeting, the Committee “requested the Secretariat to contact each of the
Parties that had not reported their data expressing the concern of the Implementation
Committee in the light of its mandate as approved by the Fourth Meeting of the
Parties.” UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/5/3 (9 March 1993),p. 2. Since its third meeting
(April 1992), the Committee has named in its report Parties that have not complied
with the requirement to submit (baseline) data.
[69] Maldives did not appear, but a representative from the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP, one of the MLF implementing agencies) reported on a country
program in Maldives, stating that the relevant data had just been submitted to the
Secretariat. Trinidad and Tobago did not appear, nor did Togo.
[70] Belarus, Iran, Maldives, Ukraine, and Syria. UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/7/2 (16
November 1993), pp. 2–5.
[71] These discussions are excerpted from UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/9/2 (5 October
1994), pp. 2–3.
[72] GEF-funded projects in countries with economies in transition have played a similar
role in building capacity to report the required data.
[73] See the Secretariat’s annual data report for 1995: UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/6 (25 Septem-
ber 1995), p. 2. This report also lists Russia’s data for Annex A substances as
being more than two years overdue, but Russia provided that data as part of its
deliberations with the Implementation Committee and its name was removed from
the list of delinquents. See UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/12/3 (1 December 1995), p. 8.
[74] The list referred to here is that of countries with Annex A baseline data delinquent
more than two years. For the 1994 list (which contains nine countries – seven
developing and two industrialized), see UNEP/OzL.Pro.6/5 (15 July 1994), p. 2.
[75] UNEP/OzL.Pro.6/5 (15 July 1994), p. 3.
[76] UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/6 (25 September 1995), p. 4.
[77] UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/18/75 (24 November 1995), pp. 4–7.
[78] For example, see note [54] and main text supra.
[79] See notes [14] and [15] and accompanying main text supra.
[80] Notably, Russia referred to the list when complaining about the trade sanctions im-
posed against exports of Russian-produced ODS. It argued that the milder measures
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on the list – such as financial assistance and the issuance of cautions – should be em-
ployed before harsher measures (i.e., sanctions) are effected. UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12
(27 December 1995), p. 53. For the full context, see the next section on the BBPRU
submissions.
[81] Victor, D.G., 1995, The Montreal Protocol’s Non-Compliance Procedure: Lessons
for making other international environmental regimes more effective, in Winfried
Lang, ed., The Ozone Treaties and Their Influence on the Building of Environmental
Regimes, proceedings of a workshop held in conjunction with the Seventh Meeting
of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
4 December, at Vienna, Austria.
[82] Sand, P.H., 1995, The potential impact of the Global Environmental Facility of the
World Bank, UNDP and UNEP, Enforcing Environmental Standards: Economic
Mechanisms as Viable Means? Symposium at Heidelberg, Germany, 5–7 July.
[83] For example see notes [35] and [67].
[84] Article 18.
[85] See Sze´ll, op. cit., note [6], p. 107.
[86] The request, in the form of a statement by Russia on behalf of all five of the BBPRU
countries as well as three countries that intend to become Parties to the Protocol
(Armenia, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan), is reproduced in Annex II of the report of the
eleventh meeting of the Implementation Committee,UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/11/1
(14 September 1995), pp. 13 and 14.
[87] The formal basis for this determination is the declaration by Russia, on behalf of
the five Parties, that they were unable to meet their obligations under the Protocol.
Later, that declaration and a similar letter to the Executive Director of UNEP were
formally defined as “submissions.”
[88] TEAP Ad-Hoc Working Group on CEIT Aspects, Assessment of Basic Problems
Confronting Countries with Economies in Transition in Complying with the Mon-
treal Protocol, United Nations Environmental Programme, Nairobi, Kenya.
[89] The final decisions are reported as Decisions VII/15–VII/19 (Poland, Bulgaria,
Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, respectively), UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12 (27 December
1995), pp. 31–36, pp. 51–54. For the Implementation Committee proposals, see
UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/9/Rev.1 draft decisions circulated at the Meeting of the Parties.
[90] Decision VII/17 (paragraph 7), Decision VII/18 (paragraph 9), and Decision VII/19
(paragraph 7), UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12 (27 December 1995), pp. 32–36.
[91] UNEP/ImpCom/12/3 (1 December 1995), pp. 5–6.
[92] UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12 (27 December 1995), pp. 52–54.
[93] “Substantive matters” excludes all portions of the report concerned with rules of
procedure, officers, reorganization of the Committee, and formalities in opening
and closing the meeting.
[94] The large number of lines in this category in the eighth Committee Report reflects a
lengthy (general) debate about how to classify and reclassify developing countries,
what to do if countries want to adjust data they have already reported, and some
questions related to financial assistance, which depends upon whether a country is
classified as “developing.”
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[95] Usually only a few lines of each report are devoted to general discussions, such
as the typical observation that many Parties have exceeded their obligations to
control ODS. The large number of lines devoted to general discussions in the
fourth meeting was an anomaly and reflected general presentations by the MLF and
implementing agencies that focused on projects to phase out controlled substances
in developing countries rather than data collecting; presentations they have made
to the Committee since then have focused more sharply on data collection, which
has been the main interest of the Committee and the only area where developing
countries have immediate obligations under the Protocol.
[96] Hugo M. Schally, interview with author, Vienna, Austria, June 1995.
[97] Sze´ll, op. cit., note [6], p. 107.
[98] Schally, op. cit., note [7], p. 90.
[99] Sze´ll, op. cit., note [6], p. 45.
[100] Koskenniemi, op. cit., note [7].
Appendix I
Terms of Reference for the
Non-Compliance Procedure
(As developed by the ad hoc Working Group of Legal Experts, adopted on an
interim basis at the second Meeting of the Parties, subsequently elaborated and
adjusted, and adopted in its current form at the fourth Meeting of the Parties.)
From: Ozone Secretariat, Handbook for the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, third edition, United Nations Environmental Pro-
gramme, Nairobi, Kenya.
Non-Compliance Procedure
The following procedure has been formulated pursuant to Article 8 of the
Montreal Protocol. It shall apply without prejudice to the operation of the settle-
ment of disputes procedure laid down in Article 11 of the Vienna Convention.
1. If one or more Parties have reservations regarding another Party’s implemen-
tation of its obligations under the Protocol, those concerns may be addressed
in writing to the Secretariat. Such a submission shall be supported by cor-
roborating information.
2. The Secretariat shall, within two weeks of its receiving a submission, send
a copy of that submission to the Party whose implementation of a particular
provision of the Protocol is at issue. Any reply and information in support
thereof are to be submitted to the Secretariat and to the Parties involved
within three months of the date of the despatch or such longer period as
the circumstances of any particular case may require. The Secretariat shall
then transmit the submission, the reply and the information provided by the
Parties to the Implementation Committee referred to in paragraph 5, which
shall consider the matter as soon as practicable.
3. Where the Secretariat, during the course of preparing its report, becomes
aware of possible non-compliance by any Party with its obligations under the
Protocol, it may request the Party concerned to furnish necessary information
about the matter. If there is no response from the Party concerned within
three months or such longer period as the circumstances of the matter may
require or the matter is not resolved through administrative action or th[r]ough
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diplomatic contacts, the Secretariat shall include the matter in its report to the
Meeting of the Parties pursuant to Article 12 (c) of the Protocol and inform
the Implementation Committee accordingly.
4. Where a Party concludes that, despite having made its best, bona fide efforts, it
is unable to comply fully with its obligations under the Protocol, it may address
to the Secretariat a submission in writing, explaining, in particular, the specific
circumstances that it considers to be the cause of its non-compliance. The
Secretariat shall transmit such submission to the [I]mplementation Committee
which shall consider it as soon as practicable.
5. An Implementation Committee is hereby established. It shall consist of
10 Parties elected by the [M]eeting of the Parties for two years, based on
equitable geographical distribution. Outgoing Parties may be re-elected for
one immediate consecutive term. The Committee shall elect its own President
and Vice-President. Each shall serve for one year at a time. The Vice-
President shall, in addition, serve as the rapporteur of the Committee.
6. The Implementation Committee shall, unless it decides otherwise, meet twice
a year. The Secretariat shall arrange for and service its meetings.
7. The functions of the Implementation Committee shall be:
(a) To receive, consider and report on any submission in accordance with
paragraphs 1, 2 and 4;
(b) To receive, consider and report on any information or observations
forwarded by the Secretariat in connection with the preparation of the
reports referred to in Article 12 (c) of the Protocol and on any other
information received and forwarded by the Secretariat concerning com-
pliance with the provisions of the Protocol;
(c) To request, where it considers necessary, through the Secretariat, further
information on matters under its consideration;
(d) To undertake, upon the invitation of the Party concerned, information-
gathering in the territory of that Party for fulfilling the functions of the
Committee;
(e) To maintain, in particular for the purposes of drawing up its recommen-
dations, an exchange of information with the Executive Committee of
the Multilateral Fund related to the provision of financial and technical
cooperation, including the transfer of technologies to Parties operating
under Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Protocol.
8. The Implementation Committee shall consider the submissions, information
and observations referred to in paragraph 7 with a view to securing an amicable
solution of the matter on the basis of respect for the provisions of the Protocol.
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9. The Implementation Committee shall report to the Meeting of the Parties,
including any recommendations it considers appropriate. The report shall
be made available to the Parties not later than six weeks before their meet-
ing. After receiving a report by the Committee the Parties may, taking into
consideration the circumstances of the matter, decide upon and call for steps
to bring about full compliance with the Protocol, including measures to as-
sist the Parties’ compliance with the Protocol, and to further the Protocol’s
objectives.
10. Where a Party that is not a member of the Implementation Committee is iden-
tified in a submission under paragraph 1, or itself makes such a submission,
it shall be entitled to participate in the consideration by the Committee of that
submission.
11. No Party, whether or not a member of the Implementation Committee, in-
volved in a matter under consideration by the Implementation Committee,
shall take part in the elaboration and adoption of recommendations on that
matter to be included in the report of the Committee.
12. The Parties involved in a matter referred to in paragraphs 1, 3 or 4 shall
inform, through the Secretariat, the Meeting of the Parties of the results of
proceedings taken under Article 11 of the Convention regarding possible non-
compliance, about implementation of those results and about implementation
of any decision of the Parties pursuant to paragraph 9.
13. The Meeting of the Parties may, pending completion of proceedings initiated
under Article 11 of the Convention, issue an interim call and/or recommen-
dations.
14. The Meeting of the Parties may request the Implementation Committee to
make recommendations to assist the Meeting’s consideration of matters of
possible non-compliance.
15. The members of the Implementation Committee and any Party involved in
its deliberations shall protect the confidentiality of information they receive
in confidence.
16. The report, which shall not contain any information received in confidence,
shall be made available to any person upon request. All information ex-
changed by or with the Committee that is related to any recommendation by
the Committee to the Meeting of the Parties shall be made available by the
Secretariat to any Party upon its request; that Party shall ensure the confiden-
tiality of the information it has received in confidence.
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Indicative List of Measures That Might Be Taken
by a Meeting of the Parties in Respect of
Non-Compliance with the Protocol
A. Appropriate assistance, including assistance for the collection and reporting
of data, technical assistance, technology transfer and financial assistance,
information transfer and training.
B. Issuing cautions.
C. Suspension, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law con-
cerning the suspension of the operation of a treaty, of specific rights and privi-
leges under the Protocol, whether or not subject to time limits, including those
concerned with industrial rationalization, production, consumption, trade,
transfer of technology, financial mechanism and institutional arrangements.
Appendix II
Tabulated Data on the Substantive Work
of the Implementation Committee
Table A.1. Substantive work of the Montreal Protocol Implementation Committee
(lines of meeting reports devoted to general and specific topics).
Meeting of the
Impl. Committee General, General, Specific, Specific, Ad hoc
(date of meeting) dataab non-dataac databd non-datacd proceduree Total
1 (12/90) 45 0 4 0 — 49
2 (12/91) 27 0 0 0 — 27
3 (4/92) 110 10 23 10 — 153
4 (9/92) 133 69 9 0 — 211
5 (3/93) 68 0 17 0 — 85
6 (8/93) 137 3 28 0 — 168
7 (11/93) 44 0 101 34 — 179
8 (7/94) 461 10 53 69 — 593
9 (10/94) 135 0 94 71 — 300
10 & 11 (8/95) 107 36 150 358 317 651
12 (12/95) 54 13 34 318 283 419
aGeneral= Matters related to noncompliance of a general nature, including general debates and
discussions not focused on, or motivated by, concerns about a particular country.
bData = Concerning the reporting and availability of data as required under the Montreal Protocol
and subsequent revisions, including discussions about how to handle the substantive obligations of
countries that have not fully reported their data, whether to tie assistance under the MLF to the full
reporting of data, etc.
cNon-data = Matters related to noncompliance that are not primarily the reporting of data; in practice,
these are concerns and observations that are related to the central obligations of the treaty and its
amendments, i.e., the control of ODS.
dSpecific = Matters related to noncompliance that are focused on, or motivated by, concerns about
a particular country.
eFigure indicates the number of lines devoted to the BBPRU submissions handled under the ad hoc
procedure (also coded as “specific,” mostly “non-data”).
fMeeting no. 4 marks the first participation of the MLF and implementing agencies; their reports at
that meeting account for 133 lines.
gMeeting no. 7 tabulations have been increased by 25% to account for a different (smaller) font.
iMeeting nos. 10 and 11 are tabulated together; they considered the same agenda and occurred
within a few days of one another.
